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INTRODUCTION
Ask anyone who follows legal news to name the two biggest litigation
news stories in the United States at the start of the twenty-first century,
and they will answer without blinking: Microsoft and tobacco. The
Microsoft litigation, they will tell you, claims a place in the pantheon of
antitrust landmarks that includes Standard Oil, Alcoa, and AT&T. The
tobacco litigation is the most massive in a string of mass torts including
asbestos, Dalkon Shield, and breast implants; it is arguably the most
important public health matter ever litigated.
Microsoft and tobacco each fit so well and so interestingly in their own
line of antitrust or product liability cases that it would be easy to miss
what the two stories have in common. The Microsoft and tobacco
litigations each involve allegations of wrongful conduct causing
widespread harm, committed by actors so powerful they seemed
immune to attack by private litigants. In each case, government lawsuits
broke down the barriers to successful litigation, and private litigants,
particularly those pursuing class actions, rode the government's
coattails. This pattern is not limited to tobacco and Microsoft, nor is it
new; in antitrust, securities, civil rights, and consumer fraud litigation,
private plaintiffs have been riding government coattails for years But
the pattern has emerged with new significance due to governments'
growing aggressiveness in pursuing monetary recoupment actions
2 3against industries, renewed vigor in enforcing antitrust and consumerprotection laws,4 and the rise of class action lawyers as major players in
' See John C. Coffee Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv. 215, 222 (1983) [hereinafter Coffee,
Private Attorney General] (noting that "a recurring pattern is evident under which the
private attorney general simply piggybacks on the efforts of public agencies - such as the
SEC, the FTC, and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice - in order to reap the
gains from the investigative work undertaken by these agencies"). This phenomenon has
been especially pronounced in antitrust litigation. See id. at 222 n.16 (citing examples). A
prominent example outside the antitrust area, Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979),
involved the successful trial of a Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement action
against Parklane Hosiery, followed by plaintiffs' assertion of issue preclusion in a
shareholder class action.
2 See Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries,
75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 355 (2000) ("Citizens sue industries for tort injuries. That is familiar.
Governments sue the same industries for costs suffered in ameliorating or preventing those
injuries. That is unfamiliar.").
' See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Readying the Slingshot for a Modern Goliath, N.Y. TIMEs,
June 12, 1998, at B2 (describing re-emergence of antitrust enforcement in 1990s).
See, e.g., Dominic Bencivenga, Chairman Pitofsky Seen as Tough Enforcer, N.Y.L.J., Apr.
13, 1995, at 1 (reporting that new FTC chair will expand scrutiny in consumer protection
areas of cable television, advertising and cyberspace); Stephen J. Squeri, Government
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the economy.'
Some observers object to the easy ride that plaintiffs and their lawyers
get by piggybacking on government actions. A Wall Street Journal
editorial, for example, labeled class counsel in the Microsoft class actions
"tort parasites,"6 and The Washington Post called the lawyers "predatory"
and the class actions "simple buzzardry."7 These observers, I submit,
have latched onto the wrong problem. There is nothing inherently
troubling about private class actions that seek to benefit from successful
government litigation. Properly managed, such class actions offer a
relatively fair and efficient mechanism for extending the benefits of
government legal work to provide redress to injured citizens. The fact
that they follow government actions tends to make such class actions
more fair and efficient, not less so. Rather than a wholesale attack on
coattail class actions, it is more useful to examine what they can and
cannot accomplish, and what implications the phenomenon carries for
how lawyers and courts should handle both the class actions themselves
and the government lawsuits they follow.
While government actions and class actions both can be described as
representative litigation, the decision-makers in the two types of actions
do not represent the same constituents. Class action lawyers are duty-
bound to represent the interests of the particular class, whereas
government lawyers represent the government entity, with special
obligations toward the public good. Nor are government and class
action lawyers driven by the same political and financial incentives. In
thinking about the proper spheres of government actions and class
actions in Microsoft, tobacco, and other litigation based on widespread
harm to citizens, it is useful to consider the different forces driving the
representatives.
Moreover, coattail class actions and related litigation developments
create an interdependence between government and private actions that
Investigation and Enforcement: Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission, in 2 37th
ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW INSTrruTE 539, 641 (William T. Lifland, et al., eds., 1996).
' See, e.g., Adam Cohen, Are Lawyers Running America?, TIME, July 17, 2000, at 22.
Although the plaintiff's bar has long been willing to invest substantial resources to pursue
promising claims, the size of their war chests has increased dramatically in the past decade,
due in significant part to fees earned in asbestos and other mass tort cases. See id. at 25;
Peter Pringle, Cornered: Big Tobacco at the Bar of Justice 25-26 (1998); Dan Zegart, Civil
Warriors: The Legal Siege on the Tobacco Industry (2000); Claudia Maclachlan, Plaintiffs'
Bar Aims, Once More at Tobacco, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 26, 1994, at A14.
' Judge Posner's Brief, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1999, at A22.
' Editorial, Actions Without Class, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1999, at A38.
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mixes the roles of public and private lawyers.' Not only are government
entities pursuing lawsuits that invite and support private class actions,
but some of those government lawsuits seek money damages for
defendants' injurious conduct toward citizens. Private lawyers,
meanwhile, not only use the fruits of government litigation to benefit
their private clients, but some of those private lawyers are actually
handling the government's cases, as government entities retained private
litigators to pursue their claims against both Microsoft and the tobacco
industry. Such mixing of lawyer roles need not be a bad thing, but it
warrants attention from a sufficiently broad perspective.
This Article examines coattail class actions and related developments
in Microsoft, tobacco, and other recent litigation involving widespread
harm. It does not address whether the government entities and private
plaintiffs have valid claims in the Microsoft and tobacco cases, nor does
it consider whether the underlying substantive law itself is just or wise.
For purposes of this discussion, my interest in these cases is not to enter
the raging debate over the legal and factual issues in them,9 but rather to
look at whether their procedural structure of interdependent public and
private actions offers a sensible model for the resolution of claims of
widespread harm.
Part One looks at the Microsoft antitrust litigation and the tobacco
litigation as illustrations of the relationship between government
litigation and subsequent class actions. Part Two examines two related
developments that mix public and private lawyer roles: the use of
private litigators to prosecute government lawsuits, and the nature of
recent government recoupment actions. Part Three considers the
differences between government lawyers, who owe duties to
government entities and face largely political incentives, and class action
' In discussing the mixing of public and private roles, I do not mean to suggest that in
the absence of these recent litigation developments, the public/private distinction would
be crisp. As Jody Freeman has argued in an administrative law context, "There is neither a
purely public nor a purely private realm. There is only interdependence." Jody Freeman,
The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 565 (2000).
' On the tobacco cases, see, e.g., W. KEP Viscusi, SMOKING: MAKING THE RIsKY DECISION
(1992); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Cost of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post
Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163 (1998); Symposium, Torts and Tobacco, 33 GA.
L. REV. 693 (1999); Symposium, Beyond Tobacco: Tort Issues in Light of the Cigarette Litigation,
27 PEPP. L. REV. 685 (2000); Symposium, Tobacco Regulation: The Convergence of Law, Medicine
& Public Health, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 373 (1999). On the Microsoft antitrust litigation,
see, e.g., Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal
Standards and Microsoft, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (1999); R. Craig Romaine & Steven C.
Salop, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 617 (1999).
[Vol. 34:1
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lawyers, who owe duties to the class and face largely fee-based
incentives. With the idea that government lawsuits and private class
actions serve different purposes even when targeted at the same
conduct, I turn to several specific implications. Part Four looks at
implications for government suits. I suggest that government lawyers
should consider the issue preclusive value of adjudications, the public
value of discovered information, and the impact of settlement
agreements that compromise private litigants' remedies or procedural
mechanisms. I also suggest that contingent fees are generally
inappropriate for government retention of private litigators. Part Five
turns to implications for coattail class actions themselves. I contend that
while prior government litigation does not render a class action
illegitimate, the government action does matter for the outcome of the
coattail class action. Prior government litigation substantially increases
the likelihood of successful prosecution of the class action, but in some
cases it should reduce the likelihood or amount of punitive damages, as
well as the amount of legal fees awarded to class counsel.
While much of what I discuss in this Article is equally true of
individual lawsuits that piggyback on government litigation, I focus on
class actions because as representative litigation they share an essential
attribute of government actions, and thus present most starkly the
question of who should represent the interests of injured citizens in
litigation: government officials or class representatives and class counsel.
I. COATrAIL CLASS ACTIONS
Coattail class actions are a common feature of mass litigation. By"coattail class action," I mean a class action that follows government
litigation, seeking to benefit from the government's work. Although this
definition is not limited to actions against especially strong defendants,
the phenomenon's most impressive manifestations involve government
litigation against seemingly invincible defendants such as Microsoft and
the tobacco industry. The chance of successful private litigation rises
dramatically when government litigation paves the way.10
10 Empirical evidence suggests that government proceedings greatly increase the
likelihood of private litigation success. In a study of antitrust class actions in the Northern
District of Illinois, Benjamin Du Val found "a striking correlation between plaintiffs'
success and the existence of a government proceeding." Benjamin S. Du Val Jr., The Class
Action as an Antitrust Enforcement Device: The Chicago Experience (Part II), 1976 AM. BAR
FOUND. RES. J. 1273, 1282. His findings were as follows: First, where there had been a
related government proceeding, either successful or unsuccessful, private plaintiffs almost
always met with some measure of success in a subsequent private action. Second, all of the
2000]
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Coattail riding happens in various ways. At the outset, a government
lawsuit or investigation may simply give lawyers or litigants the idea for
the private suit, or spur to action those who had been considering such a
suit, and may suggest ideas or language for the complaint. Government
litigation may also generate documentary discovery or other information
that private litigants use in their lawsuits. The government suit may
result in a judgment with issue preclusive effect against the defendant in
subsequent private litigation. Successful government litigation may
facilitate private claims by altering public attitudes about the defendants'
liability. In economic terms, the plaintiff's attorney, who in most cases is
compensated only for success, rationally seeks to minimize both failure
rates and search costs by free riding on the government's work.' The
Microsoft and tobacco cases illustrate a variety of causal connections
between government litigation and subsequent class actions.
A. The Microsoft Antitrust Litigation
The Microsoft antitrust litigation involves claims that software giant
Microsoft Corporation illegally restrained competition by tying its
Internet browser to its Windows operating system, among other things.2
In May 1998, the U.S. Department of Justice and nineteen state attorneys
general filed two antitrust actions against Microsoft in federal court. 3
After a bench trial, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson issued findings of
fact on November 5, 1999, making it very clear that he was prepared to
rule that Microsoft had violated the antitrust laws. 4 On April 3, 2000,
the court issued conclusions of law 5 and on June 7, 2000 the court
entered final judgment ordering a breakup of the company and
cases in which plaintiffs settled for $500,000 or more came when there had been a related
government proceeding. Third, private class actions rarely met with success in the absence
of a related government proceeding. See id. Similarly, looking at litigation concerning
insider trading, Professor Michael Dooley found few private actions that were not
preceded by an SEC proceeding, and the plaintiffs in those cases had been "spectacularly
unsuccessful." See Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L.
REV. 1, 16 & n.82 (1980).
" See John C. Coffee Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 681 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Plaintifs Attorney]. Professor Coffee
points to private antitrust class actions piggybacking on government proceedings as the"classic illustration" of this pattern. See id.
" See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (conclusions of
law); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (findings of fact).
" See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9.
"4 See id.
15 See Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (finding that Microsoft violated antitrust law).
(Vol. 34:1
Coattail Class Actions
restrictions on certain business practices. 16  Although the remedies
remained in doubt until June, it was already clear in November that the
court would find squarely against Microsoft on the question of liability.17
In the wake of Judge Jackson's findings of fact, private class actions
against Microsoft dramatically picked up steam. Prior to November
1999, few class actions had been filed against Microsoft, and none of
them had achieved much notice or significance. 8 Within weeks after the
findings, many private antitrust class actions were filed against
Microsoft. 9 By the time the court issued its conclusions of law in April
2000, over one hundred consumer class actions had been filed.20 The
conclusions of law provided "powerful new ammunition to lawyers
pursuing class-action cases."2' Indeed, within two months after the court
entered final judgment in favor of the government, lawyers had filed
over 140 private class actions against Microsoft2 In August 2000, a
California state court certified two statewide consumer classes in the
consolidated proceedings of twenty-eight Microsoft antitrust actions.23
The contrast is stark. Before November 1999, few lawyers were
interested in pursuing consumer antitrust claims against Microsoft,
16 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64-74 (D.D.C. 2000), appeal denied,
121 S. Ct. 25 (2000).
17 See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Microsoft Faces a Class Action on 'Monopoly,' N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22,
1999, at Al ("Judge Jackson's findings agreed so strongly with the case presented by the
Justice Department and 19 states that antitrust experts say his final verdict, expected early
next year, will almost surely find that Microsoft is a monopoly that violated the law.").
"8 See Karen Donovan, Mike's Friendly Microsoft Takeover, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 14,2000, at Al
(differentiating between lawyers who had been pursuing class actions against Microsoft
since February 1999 and those involved in "the deluge of filings after the Nov. 5 ruling");
Dennis J. Opatrny, Firms Tangle Over Microsoft Suits, THE RECORDER (Jan. 21, 2000), at
http://www.law.com/news/A13932-2000Jan2O.html.
1" See Donovan, supra note 18; Opatrny, supra note 18; see also Lohr, supra note 17
(reporting on "what could become a flood of major lawsuits springing from the Justice
Department's antitrust action against the company"). Among those filing class actions
against Microsoft after November 5, 1999 were Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, a
leading securities class action firm, Lieff Cabraser, a leading mass tort class action firm, and
Stanley Chesley, another prominent mass tort lawyer. See Donovan, supra note 18.
" See Joel Brinkley & Steve Lohr, Expedited Appeal Proposed by Judge in Microsoft Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2000, at Al, C2.
" Joel Brinkley, U.S. Judge Says Microsoft Violated Antitrust Laws With Predatory
Behavior, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2000, Al, C12 (quoting Stephen Houck, lead lawyer for states
in their suit against Microsoft).
' See Richard Des Ruisseaux, Local Microsoft Suit Dismissed, THE COURIER-JOURNAL,
July 26, 2000, at 1C; James Rowley, Case Against Microsoft Dismissed in Kentucky, SEATrLE
TIMES, July 25, 2000, at E2.
See Dennis J. Opatrny, Judge Certifies Microsoft Classes, THE RECORDER, Aug. 30, 2000,
at http://www.callaw.com/stories/edt0830h.shtml (citing Lingo v. Microsoft, No. 301357
(Aug. 29, 2000)).
2000]
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perhaps because it was not worth taking on a complex and uncertain
case against a powerful defendant. As a matter of sheer size, nearly any
private plaintiff would have felt outmatched by the software giant.2 4 The
Justice Department lawsuit completely changed the picture. No longer
was the case so complex, because the government lawyers had sorted
out the issues and put together the evidence, and Judge Jackson spelled
out his factual findings.2 "It makes a hell of a road map," one plaintiffs'
26lawyer said . Or, to put it more bluntly, "Scan the ruling into a word
processor, add some legal boilerplate, and presto: instant class action."
27
No longer were the claims so uncertain, because they had succeeded
once, and issue preclusion might dictate the issue of liability without the
need for new proof of antitrust violations.2 By vanquishing the
seemingly invincible defendant, the Department of Justice turned
Microsoft into a much more appealing target for private class action
lawyers) 9 Even if the judgment is reversed or modified on appeal,3° the
' The Justice Department's trial lawyer in the Microsoft case summed it up well:
"Microsoft and the government were the perfect opponents. The government has some
power, but Microsoft has at least as much. Anyone else facing either one of them would be
overmatched." Joel Brinkley & Steve Lohr, Retracing the Missteps in the Microsoft Defense,
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2000, at Al (quoting attorney David Boies). Not only is the federal
government bigger than private litigants, it has procedural advantages as well. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. §§ 57b-1, 1312 (1994) (permitting "civil investigative demands" by Federal Trade
Commission and Department of Justice in antitrust investigations).
Indeed, some of the class action complaints referred explicitly to the Justice
Department suit and to Judge Jackson's findings of fact. See, e.g., Complaint, DeJulius v.
Microsoft Corp., No. 1:99CV03148, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19184, at *1-2 (D.D.C. Nov. 29,
1999) ("1. Reference is made to the Court's Findings of Fact dated November 5, 1999 in
United States v. Microsoft .... 2. Based in whole or in part on the Findings, plaintiff has
good grounds to believe and does allege that defendant.., charged supracompetitive
prices [for operating systems].").
' David Segal, New Legal Guns Train on Microsoft, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1999, at El
(quoting John Coale).
27 Mike France, Bashing Microsoft (Whatever That Is), BUS. WK., Jan. 31, 2000, at 6.
In particular, Judge Jackson's finding that Microsoft chose to charge the revenue-
maximizing price of $89 for the Windows98 upgrade after having considered a price of $49,
was viewed as "an invitation to a class-action lawsuit." Lohr, supra note 17, at Al (quoting
former Justice Department antitrust official Robert Litan).
' As The New York Times reported after the court's conclusions of law, "With Judge
Jackson having ruled on Monday that Microsoft was a 'predatory' monopolist that
repeatedly violated antitrust laws, private plaintiffs have a far less daunting
challenge .... Joel Brinkley & Steve Lohr, Expedited Appeal Proposed by Judge in Microsoft
Case, N.Y. TnMEs, Apr. 5, 2000, at Al, C2. One of the class action lawyers was quoted as
saying, "We're very pleased with the way the government case came out.... This is very
good news for the consumer class-action cases." Id. (quoting Leonard B. Simon of Milberg
Weiss firm).
o As of this writing, the Supreme Court had denied a direct appeal under 15 U.S.C. §
29(b) and remanded the matter for appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of
2000] Coattail Class Actions
government action nonetheless will have triggered the class actions, and
provided experience upon which the class action lawyers can build.
B. The Tobacco Litigation
The tobacco litigation presents a more complex procedural picture, yet
it shares with Microsoft the feature of coattail class actions. Prior to the
mid-1990's, 1l3ivate tobacco plaintiffs consistently lost to the
overpowering defense of the tobacco industry.1 It appeared that the
momentum had shifted when the Castano v. American Tobacco nationwide
class action, by far the strongest shot private litigation had ever taken at
tobacco, was filed in March 1994 and certified in early 1995.32 The
Castano effort stalled, however, when the class was decertified the
following year by the Fifth Circuit.33
As the Castano class action was making its way through the trial and
appellate courts, and as the lawyers shifted their efforts from the
nationwide class action to statewide class actions in various state and
federal courts,34 a number of state attorneys general began pursuing
recoupment claims for tobacco-related illness payments. Mississippi
filed the first of the state suits in May 1994, and over the next three years
most of the other states followed.35
Columbia Circuit. See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 25 (2000).
31 Peter Pringle described the tobacco companies' record through 1992 as follows:
"Eight hundred and thirteen claims filed against the industry, twenty-three tried in court,
two lost, both overturned on appeal. Not a penny paid in damages." PRINGLE, supra note
5, at 7. A lawyer for R.J. Reynolds in the 1980's wrote an internal memo describing the
company's successful litigation strategy to encourage voluntary dismissals by plaintiffs:
The aggressive posture we have taken regarding depositions and discovery in
general continues to make these cases extremely burdensome and expensive for
plaintiffs' lawyers, particularly sole practitioners. To paraphrase General Patton,
the way we won these cases was not by spending all of [RJR]'s money, but by
making that other son of a bitch spend all of his.
Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 414, 421 (D.N.J. 1993) (quoting 1988
memorandum by attorney J. Michael Jordan).
"' Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995), rev'd, 84 F.3d 734
(5th Cir. 1996).
Castano, 84 F.3d 734.
' See, e.g., Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1998); Chamberlain v.
American Tobacco Co., 70 F. Supp. 2d 788 (N.D. Ohio 1999); Clay v. American Tobacco Co.,
188 F.R.D. 483 (S.D. IlM. 1999); Scott v. American Tobacco Co., 725 So. 2d 10 (La. App. 1998);
Richardson v. Philip Morris, Inc., 752 A.2d 200 (Md. 2000).
' See The Tobacco Control Resource Center, The Multistate Master Settlement Agreement
and the Future of State and Local Tobacco Control: An Analysis of Selected Topics and Provisions of
the Multistate Master Settlement Agreement of November 23, 1998, at
University of California, Davis
State lawsuits had at least two advantages over the private actions that
had been failing for decades. First, the state governments as a group did
not face the overwhelming resource imbalance that typified the earlier
wave of private tobacco litigation. According to Mississippi attorney
general Michael Moore, "What we did was we built as big an army with
as much resources as the tobacco industry had, and we got to that point
which I think was probably around twenty or twenty-five states. That's
when we... began to hear from the tobacco industries somewhere
around January or February that they were interested in working
something out."36
Second, the government lawsuits sidestepped to some extent the
personal responsibility defense that had worked so successfully for the
tobacco industry against smoker plaintiffs. Private plaintiffs had found
it difficult to overcome the defendants' argument based on freedom of
choice and smokers' implicit blameworthiness. 37 Although as a matter of
legal doctrine it is debatable whether government recoupment lawsuits
can entirely ignore this argument,m as a practical matter the government
actions appeared to circumvent the defense. Government lawsuits
would offer jurors the perceived win-win opportunity to punish the
tobacco companies without rewarding individual smokers.39
As a result of these advantages, the state lawsuits drove the tobacco
companies to the negotiating table. Although a 1997 global settlement
http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/msa/index.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2000).
' Panel Discussion, The Tobacco Settlement: Practical Implications and the Future of the
Tort Law, 67 MIss. L.J. 847, 870 (1998) [hereinafter Mississippi Panel Discussion]. To some
extent, the playing field was leveled by the size and power of the state governments, as
compared with private plaintiffs, although the powerful consortium of plaintiffs' attorneys
in the Castano class action was a notable exception to the David and Goliath posture that
characterized earlier tobacco litigation. See Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation:
Procedural and Ethical Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DuKE
L.J. (forthcoming Nov. 2000) (manuscript at 10-11, on file with author) [hereinafter
Erichson, Informal Aggregation] (discussing collaborative effort by Castano group).
3' See PRINGLE, supra note 5, at 5; ZEGART, supra note 5, at 92-93.
See Dagan & White, supra note 2, at 373-76 & n.90 (arguing that states' only viable
claim was subrogation, which leaves intact defenses that could be asserted against
individual smokers).
See Richard A. Daynard & Graham E. Kelder, The Many Virtues of Tobacco Litigation,
TRIAL, Nov. 1998, at 34, 36 (calling medical cost reimbursement actions an "equalizer in the
current wave of tobacco litigation" because plaintiff third-party payor is not smoker);
Mississippi Panel Discussion, supra note 36, at 871 (quoting attorney Richard Scruggs
describing his legal strategy in Mississippi's suit as not suing "on behalf of individual
smokers where we would be stuck to subrogation to the defenses who were against the
smoker."); Cohen, supra note 5, at 25 ("Scruggs and Moore decided to try to get around
these 'personal responsibility' defenses by suing on behalf of states, not individuals.").
[Vol. 34:1
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40 41proposal4 ultimately fell apart in a political -drama, the tobacco
defendants continued to negotiate with the attorneys general. In 1998,
the states registered a huge success. After Mississippi, Florida, Texas,
and Minnesota reached settlements with the defendants totaling over $36
billion,4 2 the remaining forty-six states signed a November 1998
settlement involving approximately $206 billion in payments by tobacco
defendants over the first twenty-five years, plus additional amounts
thereafter. 43 In addition to monetary payments, the settlement included
substantial reforms, such as prohibitions on youth-oriented marketing
techniques.44
As the state lawsuits accumulated, proceeded, and settled, they not
only generated momentum but also established an enormous arsenal of
information and arguments to use against tobacco defendants. Private
plaintiffs' attorneys could access a wealth of information and capitalize
on the government's discovery. Minnesota established a publicly
accessible document depository containing over 35 million pages
discovered in its lawsuit.4 Many of the documents are available on the
Internet, along with a catalog of the materials.46 Also available on the
Proposed Tobacco Industry Settlement (June 20, 1997), http://stic.neu.edu/settlement
/6-20-settle.htm.
See Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO. L.J.
1983, 2020-22 (1999). For a discussion of the 1997 settlement proposal's restrictions on
private litigation, see infra notes 146-153 and accompanying text.
Mississippi's $3.5 billion settlement and Florida's $11.3 billion settlement were
reached in 1997. Texas's $15.3 billion settlement and Minnesota's $6.6 billion settlement
were reached in 1998. The Minnesota settlement, unlike the others, occurred at the
conclusion of trial. See Symposium, The Tobacco Litigation and Attorneys' Fees, 67 FORDHAM
L. REv. 2827, 2851 (1999) [hereinafter Fordham Symposium] (discussing timing of
Minnesota's settlement).
I See Multistate Master Settlement Agreement at http://Uww.tobacco.neu.edu/extra/
multistatesettlement.htm, sec. IX(c)(1) (listing base payments pursuant to settlement).
See id., sec. II(a)-(b).
"3 See Mark Gottlieb, Finding the Smoking Guns in Tobacco Litigation, TRIAL, Nov. 1999, at
22. Minnesota's attorney general Hubert H. "Skip" Humphrey 1II boasted about the
documents discovered by Minnesota: "It was no secret to anybody that Minnesota, of all
the litigating states, had built the strongest foundation for a tobacco trial. We were forcing
what was to become the largest production of documents in history." Hubert H.
Humphrey III, The Decision to Reject the June, 1997 National Settlement Proposal and Proceed to
Trial, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 397, 399 (1999). He emphasized that "[g]etting the
documents was not easy." Id. at 397. See also John Schwartz & Saundra Torry, Tobacco
Industry Faces 'Smoking Howitzers' in Minnesota Suit, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1998, at A9
("Minnesota Attorney General Hubert H. Humphrey III says his warehouse of 33 million
pages of internal industry documents doesn't just contain smoking guns, but 'smoking
Howitzers."').
" See Gottlieb, supra note 45, at 22. The index can be found at
http://tobacco.neu.edu/mntrial/index.html. Many of the documents are available at
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Internet are trial exhibits from the Washington state litigation,47
pleadings and rulings from various state cases, and many other items of
use to tobacco plaintiffs' lawyers.49
In addition to the documents and other information unearthed by
government actions, the government lawsuits helped to foster a change
in attitudes about tobacco liability. The public became accustomed to the
idea of tobacco liability, thus facilitating private lawsuits and
empowering jurors not only to find against the industry,50 but to find
against it for dollar amounts in the billions.51
New attitudes even found their way into corporate boardrooms.
Liggett chief executive Bennett LeBow, apparently influenced by several
developments including the swell of state lawsuits, decided to break
ranks with the other tobacco companies."2 Liggett turned internal
documents over to the states, and LeBow began testifying on behalf of
tobacco plaintiffs.53
http://stic.neu.edu/commercecommit/altemate.html.
" See The Attorney General of Washington, Trial Exhibits, at
http://www.wa.gov/ago/tobacco/exhibits.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2000).
' See The State Tobacco Information Center, Attorneys General Bringing Tobacco
Industry to Justice, at http://stic.neu.edu (last visited Nov. 19, 2000).
"' See Gottlieb, supra note 45 (listing and describing of useful Internet sites for tobacco
plaintiffs' lawyers).
See Joan Biskupic, Jurors Vent Outrage at Industry, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1999, at Al
("'All these cases have a snowball effect,' [Professor Robert] Rabin added, 'as potential
jurors read . .. about an industry that appears to have been involved in some coverup and
then gets nailed. They feel empowered to act likewise.").
" See W. Kip Viscusi, A Postmortem on the Cigarette Settlement, 29 CuMB. L. REv. 523,
544 (1999) [hereinafter Viscusi, Postmortem] ("One potential ramification of the [state
tobacco] settlement is that now juries are beginning to think in terms of billions rather than
millions as a realistic dollar figure for a tort liability outcome.").
52 LeBow explained his change of heart in a 1998 speech:
[I]n the early 1990's, a number of new things happened. Various states around
the country began filing lawsuits against the tobacco companies to recover the
high costs associated with treating smokers who became ill.... These
developments, coupled with some other factors, led me in my own mind to begin
to question the "scorched earth" litigation strategy of the other tobacco
companies - which was, to put it simply, "deny, deny, deny" that smoking causes
cancer and any other disease and win all lawsuits at all costs.
Bennett S. LeBow, Drexel Commencement Speech: The Importance of Independent
Thought (June 13, 1998) (transcript available at http: / /www.liggett.net/html/drexel7_
6_.98.htm) (emphasis in original).
53 See John M. Broder, Breaking Ranks: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1997, at Al;
Second-Hand Smoke Trial in Miami Well Under Way, 11 No. 7 MEALEY'S LmG. REP.: TOBACCO,
Aug. 11, 1997.
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Private tobacco plaintiffs have used the discovery and momentum
generated by the state suits to support their claims." While most courts
have refused to certify tobacco class actions," some class actions have
moved forward,s and all of them rely on the groundwork laid by the
state suits.5 7 A class action of flight attendants claiming exposure to
second-hand smoke, s' in which LeBow testified at trial,5 settled in 1997
for $349 million.60 In February 2000, plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit
accusing tobacco companies of price-fixing, based on documents
61discovered in the state cases. Indeed, one of the plaintiffs' lawyers in
the price-fixing class action had worked on the state tobacco lawsuits as
the former antitrust chief for the State of Washington.62
I See Richard A. Daynard & Mark Gottlieb, Keys to Litigating Against Tobacco
Companies, TRIAL, Nov. 1999, at 18, 20 (listing "exploiting the discovery work of the state
attorneys general" as one of keys to success against tobacco industry).
" See, e.g., Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1114 (1999); Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 724 (5th Cir. 1996);
Chamberlain v. American Tobacco Co., 70 F. Supp. 2d 788 (N.D. Ohio 1999); Clay v.
American Tobacco Co., 188 F.R.D. 483 (S.D. Ill. 1999); Hansen v. American Tobacco Co.,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11277 (E.D. Ark. 1999); Thompson v. American Tobacco Co., 189
F.R.D. 544 (D. Minn. 1999); Emig v. American Tobacco Co., 184 F.R.D. 379 (D. Kan. 1998);
Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 535 (W.D. Wisc. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 216
F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2000); Ruiz v. American Tobacco Co., 180 F.R.D. 194 (D.P.R. 1998); Walker
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 226 (S.D. W.V. 1997); Richardson v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
752 A.2d 200 (Md. 2000); Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 720 N.E.2d 892 (N.Y. 1999); Geiger
v. American Tobacco Co., 696 N.Y.S.2d 345 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
See Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. App. 1996); Broin v. Philip
Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. App. 1994); Scott v. American Tobacco Co., 725 So. 2d 10
(La. App. 1998).
5' See, e.g., Wisconsin Court Asked to Certify Class of Lung Cancer Victims, 5 ANDREWs
MASS TORT LmG. REP. 8 (Sept. 1998) (reporting, with regard to proposed federal court
tobacco class action in 1998, Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., that "[t]he class certification motion
relies heavily on documents produced during the Minnesota tobacco trial.").
See Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. App. 1994).
" See Second-Hand Smoke Trial, supra note 53 (reporting that LeBow testified on
behalf of the flight attendants even though Liggett remained a defendant in the case).
o See Ramos v. Philip Morris Cos., 743 So.2d 24, 27 (Fla. App. 1999).
6 See James V. Grimaldi; Tobacco Companies Face New Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Feb. 8,
2000, at E3 ("In lawsuits filed by state attorneys general, documents from the tobacco
companies emerged revealing explicit price-fixing agreements for more than half a dozen
countries, said [attorney] Paul Gallagher .... Those documents form the basis of the
lawsuit to be filed today.").
See id. (reporting that Jon Ferguson, who found many of key documents while
working as Washington's antitrust chief and lead attorney on state's tobacco suit, would
work on class action). When asked why he resigned as Washington state's antitrust chief
and joined a law firm to work on the class action, Ferguson replied, "Steve Berman got $50
million and I got a plaque." James V. Grimaldi, Hearsay, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2000, at F35.
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The most successful private action against tobacco to date is Engle v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,63 a Florida statewide class action of smokers
that proceeded to trial in 1998.64  Class counsel Stanley Rosenblatt
introduced at trial many of the documents discovered in Minnesota's
65 66lawsuit,6' and presented LeBow's testimony. The Engle jury determined
that the tobacco companies had deceived the public about the hazards
67and addictiveness of cigarettes, and subsequently awarded
compensatory damages of $12.7 million for the three class
representatives,6 8 and $144.8 billion in punitive damages, the largest
monetary verdict in history.69 Even if the Engle verdict is reduced or
reversed on appeal, the jury's determination - which would have been
unthinkable prior to 1994 when Mississippi filed the first of the state
suits - stands as a testament to the power of government lawsuits to shift
the balance of litigative power and to facilitate private class action
success.
The history of the tobacco litigation demonstrates the folly of trying to
make simple statements about complex litigation. My working
definition of coattail class actions - class actions that follow government
litigation seeking to benefit from the government's work - fails to
capture the multi-directional causal links between government and
private litigation in complex matters. Class actions often ride the
672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. App. 1996).
See Barry Meier, Trial to Begin in Big Lawsuit by Smokers in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
1998, at A7.
' See id. ("Mr. Rosenblatt said he did not plan to use surprise witnesses or industry
documents but would use records uncovered by Minnesota in its lawsuit against the
industry."); Barry Meier, Tobacco Industry Loses First Phase of Broad Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, July
8, 1999, at Al (hereinafter Meier, First Phase) ("Mr. Rosenblatt also presented thousands of
internal industry documents, including many uncovered by lawyers preparing for
Minnesota's case last year against the industry.").
6 See FL Jury Returns Verdict Against Tobacco Cos. in First Phase of Engle Trial, 6
ANDREWS MASS TORT LMG. REP. 7 (July 1999) (reporting that LeBow testified in Engle "that
cigarettes are addictive and cause numerous deadly diseases," and that he broke ranks
after he learned "that the industry had known about the health hazards of smoking for
decades, and that tobacco companies had concealed and suppressed this information").
67 See Meier, First Phase, supra note 65.
See Barry Meier, Jury Finds That Cigarettes Caused Smokers' Diseases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
8, 2000, at A7.
' See Rick Bragg, Tobacco Lawsuit in Florida Yields Record Damages, N.Y. TIMEs, July 15,
2000, at Al. The verdict imposed punitive damages of $73.96 billion on Philip Morris,
$36.28 billion on R.J. Reynolds, $17.59 billion on Brown & Williamson, $16.25 billion on
Lorillard Tobacco, $790 million on Liggett Group, $1.195 million on the Council for
Tobacco Research, and $278,389 on the Tobacco Institute. See id.; Rick Bragg & Sarah
Kershaw, Juror Says a 'Sense of Mission' Led to Huge Tobacco Damages, N.Y. TIMES, July 16,
2000, at 1, 18.
[Vol. 34:1
Coattail Class Actions
coattails of government litigation, but sometimes the private litigation
comes first.7  Claims also may interact in a more complex process in
which the government and private claims propel and reinforce each
other. Whereas the Microsoft litigation offers a relatively clean example
of coattail class actions, the tobacco litigation is better understood as a
complex, two-way process. The state lawsuits turned out to be the
breakthrough claims in the tobacco litigation, but it is unlikely that the
attorneys general could have launched their attack without the benefit of
prior litigation by private tobacco plaintiffs. In particular, the Castano
class action, by demonstrating the potential power of well-financed,
highly coordinated tobacco plaintiffs' lawyers, may have done as much
as the state suits to change the momentum. Moreover, powerful insider
information became available to tobacco plaintiffs' lawyers in the mid-
1990's, greatly strengthening both the states' and private plaintiffs' legal
claims. It probably would be accurate to say that the confluence of
these three factors - the insiders' information, the Castano class action,
and the state attorney general lawsuits - turned the tide of the tobacco
litigation.
Given the investigative powers of certain government agencies and the
well-developed mass tort plaintiffs' bar, it may be that government
actions will usually come first in antitrust and securities litigation,
whereas individual or class suits will usually come first in mass tort
litigation. Either way, recent experience shows that the onset of
government litigation powerfully assists private lawsuits and class
In the Visa/MasterCard antitrust litigation, for example, the government sought to
benefit from the private class action. A class action on behalf of retailers was filed against
Visa and MasterCard in 1996. The United States Department of Justice, which fied an
action against Visa and MasterCard in 1998, intervened in the class action in order to move
for modification of the court's protective order to allow plaintiffs to share their document
analysis with the Justice Department. The Justice Department had asked defendants to
produce any documents they had turned over in the private action, and when the number
of documents exceeded three million, the government intervened to obtain the plaintiffs'
lawyers' analysis. See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation, 190 F.R.D. 309
(E.D.N.Y. 2000); Fed. Judge Permits DOJ to Intervene in Credit Card Antitrust Action, ANDREWS
ANTrrRusT LmG. REP., Feb. 2000, at 17; see also Mark Hamblett, Justice Department Goes After
Visa and Mastercard, N.Y.L.J., June 8, 2000, at 5. For another example of government action
triggered by private litigation, see Stephen Calkins, An Enforcement Official's Reflections on
Antitrust Class Actions, 39 ARiz. L. REV. 413,422 & n.45 (1997) (describing NASDAQ Market
Makers Antitrust Litigation).
I Paralegal Merrell Williams exposed internal Brown & Williamson documents
showing the tobacco industry's knowledge of cigarette risks and nicotine addictiveness,
and whistleblower scientist Jeffrey Wigand shed light on industry knowledge and
practices. See PRINGLE, supra note 5, at 56-71, 177-93; ZEGART, supra note 5, at 77-81, 129-33,
181-93.
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actions that follow 7 2
II. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS MIXING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAWYERING
IN MASS LITIGATION
Recent developments in mass litigation combine with coattail class
actions to mix the roles of public and private lawyers. Indeed, the
mixing of public and private lawyering roles can occur even before any
piggyback class action or individual lawsuit has been filed; it occurs in
the government litigation itself. One way such mixing occurs is through
the retention of private lawyers to pursue government cases, such as trial
lawyer David Boies in the Microsoft case, and dozens of high-profile
plaintiffs' lawyers in the tobacco and handgun lawsuits. Another kind of
public-private mixing occurs when government entities seek to recoup
public funds spent to prevent or ameliorate harm by injurious industries,
as in the tobacco, handgun, and lead paint cases.
' In addition to Microsoft and tobacco, the infant formula litigation of the early 1990's
provides another interesting example of coattail class actions. The Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") and a number of states, following an aggressive government
investigation, pursued antitrust claims against the top three infant formula manufacturers,
alleging that the manufacturers fixed prices in violation of federal and state antitrust laws.
See Kathleen Day, A New Activism on Antitrust Policy: The FTC Initiates Aggressive Inquiry
into Alleged Price Fixing by Infant Formula Giants, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1991, at Hi; Barry
Meier, What Prompted Investigations into Pricing of Baby Formula?, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 19, 1991,
at 54 (reporting on investigations by FTC and state attorneys general in New York,
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Texas, and Florida); Robert Pear, F.T.C. Studying Infant Formula in
Price Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1990, at 1. Florida was the first to file suit in January
1991. See Barry Meier, Florida Alleges Fixing of Prices on Infant Food, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 1991,
at 7. Within one month after Florida fied its lawsuit, and as the FTC and the other states
pursued their investigations, two categories of private class actions emerged. First,
consumer class actions were filed against the manufacturers, alleging that shoppers had
paid inflated prices for infant formula due to illegal price-fixing. Second, classes of retailers
and wholesalers sued the manufacturers, alleging that they had paid illegally fixed prices
on formula purchased for resale. See Wade Lambert & Gregory Stricharchuk, Infant-
Formula Makers Are Sued by Retailers Citing Overpayments, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 1991, at B2.
Two of the manufacturers settled with the federal government in 1992, while a federal suit
against Abbott Laboratories went forward. See Robert Pear, Top Infant-Formula Makers
Charged by U.S. Over Pricing, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1992, at Al. Subsequently, class action
settlements were reached. See Barry Meier, Abbott Labs Settles in Florida Suits, N.Y. TIMES,
May 25, 1993, at D5 (reporting that Abbott agreed to pay "$79 million to wholesale
purchasers of formula to settle a class-action suit, $8 million to the state of Florida, and
most of the rest - about $53 million - to three major supermarket chains"); Abbott Labs
Settles FTC Case, Agrees Not to Collude on Ads, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3,1993, at A2 (noting that in
May 1993, three manufacturers "settled consolidated federal antitrust litigation in
Tallahassee, Fla., by agreeing to pay a total of more than $230 million to drugstores,
supermarkets and the state of Florida"); Mead Johnson to Pay $38.76 Million Settlement,
N.Y. Times, July 3, 1992, at D1 (reporting defendant Mead Johnson's agreement to pay
$38.76 million to settle retailer/wholesaler class action).
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A. Private Lawyers in Public Cases
The use of private lawyers to pursue government claims adds a new
dimension to the mixing of private and public lawyering that coattail
class actions entail. For example, in late 1997, Department of Justice
antitrust chief Joel Klein asked David Boies to serve as trial lawyer for
the United States in the Microsoft antitrust case. Boies, a prominent
litigator who had formed his own firm after many years as a partner at
New York's Cravath, Swaine & Moore, agreed to take the case for a
substantially reduced hourly fee.73 Klein explained that he hired Boies
because he needed an experienced lawyer for the complex trial.74 As one
commentator put it, "Klein figured the best way to fashion a noose out of
the mountain of incriminating company memos and e-mail messages
was to bring in the most accomplished legal hangman available." 75 By all
accounts, David Boies' performance at trial was an important factor in
the government's trial victory.
76
In the tobacco litigation, most of the state attorneys general retained
plaintiffs' lawyers on contingent fees, including some of the most
successful mass tort lawyers in the country. Although contingent fee
arrangements had been used occasionally by government entities in the
past, the state tobacco litigation was precedent-setting in the scale and
prominence of its use of contingent fee lawyers. 78 Ultimately, most of the
fees were resolved by arbitration, rather than strictly pursuant to the
contingent fee contracts, and some lawyers accepted reduced fees.79
' According to one report, Boies charged the Justice Department $250 per hour rather
than his usual $600 fee. See Bumiller, supra note 3, at B2. Predicting that his total bill would
be $100,000, Boies said that if it were a corporate client, "I would have added at least a
zero." Id.
, See id. The Justice Department's own lawyers did not have the requisite experience,
Klein said, because the antitrust division had not handled major antitrust cases for a
number of years. See id.
" Busting Bill Gates, THE STANDARD, (Apr. 24, 2000), at
http://www.thestandard.com/article/ display/ 0,1151,14251,00.html.
76 See Boies Wonder, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 27, 1999, at A8. For his work on the Microsoft case,
The National Law Journal selected Boies as "Lawyer of the Year" for 1999. See id. The
Internet magazine The Standard named him the Internet economy's "Most Powerful
Consigliere". See Busting Bill Gates, supra note 75.
" See Glenn G. Lammi, States Face Many Pitfalls When Hiring Contingent Fee Lawyers,
ANDREWs ToBACCO INDus. LITIG. REP., Mar. 14, 1997, at 16218 (noting that such
arrangements had been used in asbestos and environmental litigation); see also Karen
Dillon, Only $1.5 Million a Year, Am. Law., Oct. 1989, at 38 (noting that the Ness Motley firm
received about $2.3 million in fees for settling a $14 million asbestos property damage case
for the state of Minnesota).
'5 See Lammi, supra note 77.
See Fordham Symposium, supra note 42, at 2828. In Minnesota, attorney Michael
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Nevertheless, the fees are best understood as contingent, rather than
hourly or flat, inasmuch as the lawyers would have received nothing had
there been no recovery, and the amounts were driven largely by the size
of the recovery.80 Three states - Colorado, California, and Nebraska -
chose to pursue tobacco lawsuits without retaining outside lawyers. 81
Contingent fee arrangements have similarly been used in the recent
lawsuits filed by municipalities against lead paint manufacturers 2 and
handgun manufacturers, although Chicago decided to rely on its own
city and county lawyers for its gun suit, with a law firm's pro bono
assistance. 84  Blurring of public and private lawyer roles occurs most
dramatically when government retention of contingent fee lawyers
converges with another development: government recoupment claims
against industries.
B. Public Lawyers in Private Plaintiffs' Shoes
Increasingly, government lawsuits seek to recover money spent on
preventing or treating harm caused by defendants' tortious conduct.
These lawsuits put government lawyers in a role akin to private
plaintiffs' tort lawyers, and arguably somewhat different from the
traditional government lawyer role.85 This characterization does not
Ciresi had a 25% contingent fee agreement entitling his firm to $1.5 billion, but agreed to
accept a lesser fee of $440 million. See Michael Ciresi: The Anti-Marlboro Man Got the Best
Results of Anyone Fighting Big Tobacco, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 28, 1998, at A12. The Mississippi
lawyers had agreed from the outset to allow the court to determine the fee amount. See
Mississippi Panel Discussion, supra note 36, at 857-58.
' Legal ethicist Barbara Gillers explains that the state tobacco fees "are not measured
by hourly rates, nor should they be. They are a variation of what has long been called'value billing'; that is, you get in a sense what you pay for, and a contingency is a variation
of that. It does not correspond to any particular hourly rate." Fordham Symposium, supra
note 42, at 2841; cf. Samuel R. Gross, We Could Pass A Law... What Might Happen if
Contingent Legal Fees Were Banned, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 321, 321 (1998) (describing the two
essential attributes of contingent fees as "No win, No pay" and "the lawyer's fee is
proportional to the client's recovery").
81 See Gale A. Norton, The Long Term Implications of Tobacco Litigation (Jan. 8,2000),
at 7 n.13 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
See Barry Meier & Richard A. Oppel, States' Big Suits Against Industry Bring Battle on
Contingent Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1999, at Al (reporting that Ness Motley firm is
handling Rhode Island's lead paint lawsuit on seventeen percent contingent fee contract).
See Bob Van Voris, Gun Cases Use Tobacco Know-How, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 7, 1998, at Al
(reporting that, under their contingent fee contract, private lawyers in New Orleans gun
lawsuit would get twenty percent of any settlement and thirty percent of any trial victory).
New Orleans Mayor Marc Morial explained his decision to hire leading plaintiffs' lawyers
to handle the city's suit: "You want lawyers who can take on giants." Id.
See id.
See Dagan & White, supra note 2, at 355 (calling current spate of government
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apply very well to the Microsoft case, nor does it apply to most antitrust
or securities actions brought by the government, in which government
lawyers play a more familiar role as enforcers of the law. Although
antitrust law empowers state attorneys general to sue as parens patriae to
collect treble damages for harm caused to citizens,86 the role of collecting
money damages for antitrust harm has more commonly fallen to private
plaintiffs.8 7 Rather, the cases in which government lawyers have taken
on roles most reminiscent of plaintiffs' tort lawyers have largely
involved harm from dangerous products.
The leading example is the state tobacco litigation, in which state
attorneys general sued tobacco companies to recover money the states
spent to provide health care for cigarette-caused illnesses. The states'
claims, many of which were novel on the law" and controversial on the
facts,89 varied from state to state, and included subrogation, consumer
fraud, antitrust, unjust enrichment, restitution, and RICO, among
others.9 After the states had settled their claims, the U.S. Department of
Justice filed its own action against the tobacco companies, claiming
reimbursement for medical expenses.91  Former Colorado Attorney
General Gale Norton acknowledged the unusual nature of the state
tobacco suits: "In a strict legal sense, the state is collecting only its own
expenses for medical care and public services. In a less stringent sense,
the state is aggregating the claims of its citizens and fulfilling a role
lawsuits against industries to recover money spent ameliorating or preventing tort injuries
"unfamiliar").
See 15 U.S.C. § 15(c) (2000).
See Calkins, supra note 70, at 431, 442 (explaining that in terms of redress, private
class actions are more effective than government civil cases).
See Gary T. Schwartz, Tobacco, Liability, and Viscusi, 29 CUMB. L. REv. 555, 556 (1999)
("A fair observation is that never has so much money changed hands as a result of
litigation in which the theories underlying that litigation have been so uncertain - not
necessarily wrong, but undeniably uncertain."); see also Dagan & White, supra note 2, at
373-76 n.90 (rejecting all claims asserted by the states except subrogation).
One of the leading critics of the state tobacco claims is Professor Kip Viscusi, who
has argued that the states are unable to prove causation and damages because, on balance,
the states benefit financially from cigarettes. See Viscusi, Postmortem, supra note 51; W. Kip
Viscusi, The Governmental Composition of the Insurance Costs of Smoking, 42 J. LAW & EcON.
575 (1999). Viscusi also has presented research on smokers' awareness of smoking's health
risks, and their decision to smoke notwithstanding that awareness. See W. KiP ViscusI,
SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION (1992).
1 See Dagan & White, supra note 2, at 373-76 n.90; Maria Gabriela Bianchini, Comment,
The Tobacco Agreement That Went Up in Smoke: Defining the Limits of Congressional Intervention
into Ongoing Mass Tort Litigation, 87 CAL. L. REv. 703, 712 (1999).
" See Complaint, United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 1:99cv2496 (D.D.C Sept. 22,
1999), http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/cases/tobacco2/index.htm.
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similar to that of a class action. ", 2  There were earlier examples of
government recoupment lawsuits," but the tobacco suits forged new
ground in the size of the recovery, the heavy use of contingent fee
lawyers, and the coordinated multistate effort, providing a model for
government plaintiffs to follow.94
Government litigation against other industries will follow. Many have
called handguns "the next tobacco."9  Thirty-one municipalities have
sued gun manufacturers, dealers, and trade associations on recoupment
theories similar to the states' tobacco claims. 96 In October 1998, New
Orleans sued the gun industry to recover money spent responding to
gun violence, claiming that handguns are defective because they do not
incorporate available safety features.97 Chicago filed a similar suit two
weeks later. Within one year, twenty-nine municipalities had filed
lawsuits, 98 and more have filed since.99 On another front, Rhode Island
has sued the makers of lead paint to recover costs of treating and
educating lead-poisoned children as well as the costs of abating the lead
' Norton, supra note 81, at 6.
" See, e.g., Denekas v. Shalala, 943 F. Supp. 1073 (S.D. Iowa 1996); United States v.
Sosnowski, 822 F. Supp. 570 (W.D. Wisc. 1993); United States v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield
of Michigan, 726 F. Supp. 1517 (E.D. Mich. 1989); In re Dow Coming Corp., 244 B.R. 634
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999); see also Medicare Secondary Payer Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395y (2000)
(permitting recoupment actions for Medicare and Medicaid claims); Federal Medical Care
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-2653 (2000) (permitting recoupment actions for
Department of Defense, Department of Veterans' Affairs, and Indian Health Service
claims).
See, e.g., Brian J. Siebel, City Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Roadmap for
Reforming Gun Industry Misconduct, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 247, 249 ("The city and
county gun lawsuits draw inspiration from and build on the lessons learned from the
recent public lawsuits against the tobacco industry.").
" See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 5, at 25 ("Guns are already being touted as 'the next
tobacco."'); Siebel, supra note 94, at 248 ("guns have become the next tobacco"); Remarks of
Alabama Attorney General Bill Pryor, 29 CUMB. L. REv. 569, 570 (1999) [hereinafter Remarks of
Bill Pryor] ("the mayors of New Orleans and Chicago have followed the tobacco precedent
by filing lawsuits against the firearms industry").
See U.S. Cities v. The Gun Industry Lawsuits, U.S. Cities Against the Gun Industry, at
http://www.handguncontrol.org/lap/index.html (n.d.) (h g city lawsuits against gun
industry); Firearms Litigation: Current Cases, Firearms igation Clearinghouse, at
http://www.firearmslitigation.org/cases.html (n.d.); see also Paul M. Barrett & Vanessa
O'Connell, White House and Gun Industry May Discover Some Talking Points to Reach Deal on
Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 1999, at A36.
See Complaint, Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 98-18578 (Orleans Parish Civ.
Dist. Ct., Oct. 30, 1998), available at http://www.handguncontrol.org/lap/pdf-
bin/neworleans.pdf; Siebel, supra note 94, at 265.
" See Siebel, supra note 94, at 248.
' See Center to Prevent Handgun Violence, Handgun Control, at
http://www.handguncontrol.org/lap/index.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2000).
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paint problem on public property. °° Other targets await. °m Indeed, a
nationwide group of state attorneys general met in Nashville in 1999 to
discuss future targets.'2 Given the success of the state tobacco suits, it
was inevitable that government actors would pursue similar claims
against others.
Some commentators have criticized the state attorneys general for
behaving too much like private plaintiffs' lawyers. The Wall Street Journal
complained of "the sue-the-socks-off-'em compulsions" of the state
attorneys general, arguing that "the attorneys general increasingly have
become little more than deputized posses running raids against the
private sector." °3 Even the attorney general of Alabama criticized his
fellow state attorneys general for filing the tobacco suits and the mayors
for filing the handgun suits: "This dangerous marriage of the tort bar
and governmental power must be severed soon before it further weakens
what remains of limited government, the rule of law, and respect for
individual responsibility." '4
While there is nothing inherently problematic about government
entities' suing industries to recover money damages,10 some specific
devices used in recent government recoupment actions are troubling, as
the Article will discuss in Part Three, particularly the retention of private
lawyers on contingent fees,tm and the attempt to compromise private
claims in settling public suits 07 One thing is clear about the rise of
government recoupment actions against industries that have caused
widespread harm: it extends the phenomenon of coattail class actions
well beyond the relatively familiar territory of securities and antitrust
Im See Complaint, Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n (R.I. Sup. Ct. Oct. 12, 1999),
available at http://www.riag.state.ri.us/press/Oct99/Complaint.html.
11 See Dagan & White, supra note 2, at 355 ("Industries waiting in the wings for this
treatment include lead paint makers, and perhaps even brewers, distillers, and producers
of fatty foods."); Viscusi, Postmortem, supra note 51, at 544 ("The subsequent suits filed
against the gun industry by several municipalities suggest that this phenomenon may be
more widespread than being simply a tobacco related issue. Alcoholic beverages, cars, and
lead paint similarly could emerge as targets for litigation.").
" See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., State Medical Reimbursement Lawsuits After Tobacco: Is the
Domino Effect for Lead Paint Manufacturers and Others Fair Game?, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 685, 687
(2000).
10 Editorial, Who's Next, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4,2000, at A26.
1 Remarks of Bill Pryor, supra note 95, at 570.
106 This does not necessarily mean that the states and municipalities should prevail in
their claims against the cigarette, handgun, and lead paint manufacturers. See supra notes
88-89 (noting that questions have been raised about some novel legal theories asserted in
government recoupment actions).
16 See infra notes 169-191 and accompanying text.
"07 See infra notes 146-153 and accompanying text.
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piggyback litigation, and makes it a broader development in mass
litigation.
Finally, in thinking about the mixing of private and public lawyer
roles in mass litigation, it may be useful to pause on the idea of public
law litigation.1 8 David Rosenberg observed over fifteen years ago that
mass tort litigation could be understood as a form of public law
litigation.1°9  With recent developments in mass tort litigation,
particularly the use of settlement class actions, Linda Mullenix has
suggested that a private law paradigm is more apt."° "[Tihe end of the
twentieth century has been the era of aggregate private dispute
resolution," Professor Mullenix writes."'
Coattail class actions and related phenomena suggest that mass tort
litigation is more intertwined with government action, and thus more
public, than Professor Mullenix suggests. Mullenix allows that the
tobacco litigation involves government claims, but she downplays
tobacco's significance as a model in this regard:
With the recent exception of the tobacco litigation, mass tort
litigation rarely is pursued by state attorney generals or other public
officials acting parens patriae on behalf of citizens, as these officials
would in antitrust litigation, for example. Thus, very little mass tort
litigation is directly invested with a public purpose.
The handgun and lead paint litigation suggests that government
lawsuits early in the development of mass torts may become the rule,
rather than the exception. The analogy to antitrust litigation is thus
stronger than Mullenix grants, as government and private actions
intermingle in the tobacco litigation and other mass torts, just as they
intermingle in the Microsoft litigation and other antitrust matters.
As it has developed in recent years, litigation over widespread injuries
- not only mass torts but also other matters involving allegations of
widespread harm - belongs very much in the public sphere. The
" See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281 (1976) (introducing concept of "public law litigation").
" See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Tort Exposure Cases: A "Public
Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984).
,O See Linda Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law
Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U.L. REV. 413 (1999) [hereinafter Mullenix, Private Law
Paradigm]; Linda Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad: Complexity and Convergence, 46 VILL. L. REV.
(forthcoming Spring 2001) (manuscript at 1-2, on file with author), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=233659.
"' Mullenix, Private Law Paradigm, supra note 110, at 415.
112 Id. at 426.
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Microsoft antitrust litigation and the tobacco litigation, as well as the
handgun, sweepstakes, lead paint, and other lawsuits mentioned in this
Article, raise significant public policy issues and naturally draw the
attention of government officials and the media. These matters fit much
of Abram Chayes' public law litigation model, with their sprawling
rather than bipolar party structure, and remedies that require continuing
judicial or quasi-judicial involvement.1 3  In these examples of recent
mass litigation, government actors have played leading roles. At the
same time, private lawyers remain powerful players in litigation over
widespread harm,"4 and class actions provide a critical means for
obtaining and distributing compensation. The question, then, is not
whether mass litigation should be considered public or private, but
rather how the dispute resolution system should make the best use of the
attributes of each sphere. To answer this question, we must consider the
differences between two types of representative litigation.
III. NOT ALL REPRESENTATIVE LITIGATION IS ALIKE
The class action is the archetype of representative litigation, but it is
not the only type. By definition, class representatives sue on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated.' But lawsuits brought by the
government can also be viewed as representative litigation.16 The purest
example of representative litigation by the government is the parens
patriae suit, in which a state sues as "parent of the country" to protect its
..3 See Chayes, supra note 108, at 1282-84. While she focuses on the dissimilarities,
Professor Mullenix acknowledges that mass tort cases fit several aspects of the public law
paradigm. See Mullenix, Private Law Paradigm, supra note 110, at 424.
. See Barry Meier, Bringing Lawsuits to Do What Congress Won't, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26,
2000 (Week in Review), at 3 (discussing "use of concentrated legal firepower to set social
policy" on handguns, tobacco, and HMO's).
"13 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) ("One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all .... ").
"' Municipal government litigation can itself be divided into "public" and "private"
aspects, inasmuch as municipal corporations can sue in their public capacity as governing
bodies or in their quasi-private capacity as property owners. See 2A EUGENE McQuiLLIN,
THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10.05, at 304 (3d ed. 1996) ("A municipal
corporation has a twofold character and dual powers .... The one is variously designated
as public, governmental, political or legislative, in which the municipal corporation acts as
an agency of the state. The other is variously designated as municipal, private, quasi-
private, or proprietary."). For a discussion of the municipal handgun litigation in terms of
the municipalities' public and private capacities, see Note, Recovering the Costs of Public
Nuisance Abatement: The Public and Private City Sue the Gun Industry, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1521
(2000) [hereinafter Harvard Gun Note].
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quasi-sovereign interest in the health and welfare of the people,n 7 but
arguably all government lawsuits should represent the interests of the
citizenry. Not all representative litigation is alike, however. In litigation
over widespread harm, government lawsuits and class action lawsuits
generally serve non-identical purposes, represent the interests of
overlapping but different groups, and are driven by different incentives.
As a formal matter, the role of the government lawyer differs from the
role of the private class action lawyer. The public lawyer represents the
employing government agency or entity, which in turn represents the
public as part of a constitutional structure of democratic government.
While it would be facile and incorrect to say that the government lawyer
simply represents the public and should do whatever the lawyer
personally believes will advance the public interest, 1s it would be
equally incorrect to say that the government lawyer owes no greater
duty to the public good than does a private lawyer.R9 A Federal Bar
Association ethics opinion contrasted "the private practitioner [who]
represents the client's personal or private interest" with the government
lawyer, whose "employment requires him to observe in the performance
of his professional responsibility the public interest sought to be served
by the government organization of which he is a part."' 0 The duties of
the government lawyer are not measured in terms of the interests of any
particular subgroup of citizens, nor even in terms of maximizing
penalties or recoveries."
"' See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592 (1982); Jack Ratliff, Parens
Patriae: An Overview, 74 TuL. L. REv. 1847 (2000).
... See Jeffrey Rosenthal, Who Is the Client of the Government Lawyer?, in ETHICAL
STANDARDs IN THE PUBLIC SECrOR 13, 16-19 (Patricia E. Salkin ed. 1999); William Josephson
& Russell Pearce, To Whom Does the Government Lawyer Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients
Are in Conflict?, 29 How. L.J. 539 (1986); Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in
a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1294 (1987).
Il See Rosenthal, supra note 118, at 24-25.
120 Federal Bar Association Ethics Op. 73-1, reprinted in 32 FED. B.J. 71, 72 (1973); see also
Federal Bar Association, Code of Professional Responsibility, Federal Ethical Consideration
5-1, reprinted in 60 A.B.A.J. 1541, 1543-44 (1974) ("The immediate professional responsibility
of the federal lawyer is to the department or agency in which he is employed, to be
performed in light of the particular public interest function of the department or agency.").
' Jeremy Rabkin, contrasting the position of White House counsel with the position of
Justice Department lawyers, wrote:
The U.S. Department of Justice proclaims this motto on the wall of the attorney
general's rotunda: "The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its
citizens in the courts." Even when it loses a legal battle, in other words, the
Justice Department may still console itself that its clients have been served - at
least when the opposing party is also an American citizen. Attorney General
Griffin Bell articulated the premise of this thought in 1977 when he affirmed that,
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Here I should acknowledge a weakness in my argument. Government
lawyers often find themselves in adversary litigation or negotiation akin
to private adversary dealings. Arguably the adversary system works
best when the government lawyer seeks to maximize the interests of the
government entity, within the usual constraints of advocacy ethics."
Still, it seems to me that government lawyers appropriately perceive
their role as involving consideration of the public good beyond that
ordinarily exercised by private lawyers.
In contrast to the duties of government lawyers, private class counsel
owe a duty of loyalty to the members of the particular class.1 3 Indeed,
the certification of a class action is premised upon a finding that the
124lawyer will adequately represent the class interests. In a money
for the Justice Department, "the people are your client."
Jeremy Rabkin, White House Lawyering: Law, Ethics, and Political Judgments, in GOVERNMENT
LAWYERS 107, 107 (CorneU W. Clayton ed. 1995). I would not go so far as to accept the
characterization that the Justice Department lawyer's client is simply "the people." Even
Mr. Rabkin does not extend the point to all government lawyers. See id. Nevertheless, the
passage illustrates the rather different perception of the roles of Justice Department and
private lawyers.
In the criminal justice realm, the ethical obligations of defense lawyers contrast with
those of prosecutors. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (allowing exception
to rule against non-meritorious contentions to allow criminal defense lawyers to "so defend
the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established") with MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 3.8 (addressing "Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor,"
including obligation not to prosecute without probable cause, and obligation to disclose
exculpatory evidence).
1 See, e.g., Lybbert v. Grant Cty., 1 P.3d 1124, 1129 (Wash. 2000) (declining to create a
"two-tiered system of advocacy, one for legal representatives of the government and the
other for counsel of private parties"); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (constraining advocacy
conduct); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 3.1-3.9 (same).
2 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 223 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting
that class counsel owes a fiduciary duty to class members); In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 18-19 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that divergence of interests among
class members "presents special problems because the class attorney's duty does not run
just to the plaintiffs named in the caption of the case; it runs to all of the members of the
class"); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1176 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting
that class counsel owes fiduciary duties to each member of class); Greenfield v. Villager
Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that class counsel has duty to ensure that
class members receive proper settlement notice); Singer v. AT&T Corp., 188 F.R.D. 681, 690
(S.D. Fla. 1998) ("the class attorney has a fiduciary duty to the court as well as to each
member of the class"); Deborah Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV.
1183, 1203 (1982); G. Donald Puckett, Note, Peering into a Black Box: Discovery and Adequate
Attorney Representation for Class Action Settlements, 77 TEx. L. REv. 1271, 1290-91 ("The
adequate attorney representation requirement imposes fiduciary duties upon the class
attorney that are owed to each individual member of the class.").
124 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) (permitting class certification only if "the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class"); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
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damages class action, unless special circumstances present class interests
that outweigh recovery maximization, class counsel generally should
seek to maximize the recovery for the class. This is not to say that the
duties of class counsel are easily defined,29 but rather that the duties of
class counsel to the class of those harmed by alleged wrongdoing can be
fairly contrasted with the duties of government lawyers to the public
interest more broadly conceived.
Not only do the formal loyalties of public and private lawyers differ,
but different incentives and mindsets drive their conduct. The public•• 126
lawyer faces incentives largely driven by politics; private plaintiffs'
lawyers face incentives largely driven by fees.' 27  Especially in class
actions, where clients generally do not closely monitor class counsel's
conduct, fee-based incentives drive important decisions by plaintiffs'
lawyers. The mindset of plaintiffs' lawyers differs from the mindset of
government lawyers, as it should, both as a matter of loyalty duties and
as a rational response to incentives. The private lawyer's decision
whether a claim has enough merit to pursue,' 29 for example, differs
significantly from the prosecutorial discretion expected of government
lawyers."0 In sum, even though plaintiffs' class action lawyers are often
described as private attorneys general, they face rather different
incentives than the attorneys general of the federal and state
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 n.20 (1997) ("The adequacy heading also factors in competency
and conflicts of class counsel."); see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (addressing
adequacy of representation as matter of constitutional due process).
, See Puckett, supra note 123, at 1291 ("Although courts uniformly recognize the
existence of these fiduciary duties [owed by class counsel to class members], they have
struggled to define their specific content.").
126 See, e.g., DEBORAH CAULFIELD RYBAK & DAVID PHELPS, SMOKED: THE INSIDE STORY OF
THE MINNESOTA TOBAccO TRIAL 442 (1998) (noting Attorney General Skip Humphrey's rise
in polls for the Minnesota gubernatorial race following the state's tobacco trial and
settlement); Wendy E. Wagner, Rough Justice and the Attorney General Litigation, 33 GA. L.
REV. 935, 936 n.9 (1999) ("Even the attorneys general and governors who support the
litigation seem to capitalize on the political appeal of waging war against the tobacco
industry.").
12" See Coffee, Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 11, at 683-84 ("[For analytical purposes,
one better understands the behavior of the plaintiff's attorney in class and derivative
actions if one views him not as an agent, but more as an entrepreneur who regards a
litigation as a risky asset that requires continuing investment decisions.").
1 See id. at 677.
1 This decision has a business component, deciding whether the likelihood of success
and amount of damages justifies the risk of a contingent fee. See id. at 677-98. It also has an
ethical component, deciding whether the claim is supported by a reasonable factual and
legal basis. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11; MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1.
'2 See STANDARD FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-3.9; Roscoe B. Starek I, Prosecutorial
Discretion: A View from the Federal Trade Commission, 20 REGULATION No. 4 (1997).
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governments. 131 Given the entrepreneurial nature of plaintiffs' class
action representation, it is essential to consider the economic incentives
on plaintiffs' lawyers. 112 With the duties and incentives of public and
private lawyers in mind, we turn to the implications of this analysis for
government lawsuits and for class actions that follow them.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
When a government entity sues a defendant for conduct alleged to
have caused widespread harm, the government lawyers cannot ignore
the private class actions on the horizon. Rather, the government lawyer
should think about the government litigation's impact on subsequent
private suits through issue preclusion, document dissemination, or
compromise of private claims or litigation opportunities. In addition,
government entities should be wary of entering contingent fee
arrangements with private lawyers.
A. The Public Good of Litigation Outcomes and Information
Government litigation concerning widespread harm can never be
viewed as a self-contained legal process. The government litigation is
bound to have an impact on private lawsuits, either through the issue
" As a separation of powers matter, many have argued that legislatures or agencies
are better positioned to regulate industries and enact social policy, rather than attorneys
general pursuing policy initiatives through the courts. See, e.g., Remarks Bill Pryor, supra
note 95, at 571 ("These kinds of lawsuits threaten limited government because they shift
political disputes from the legislative arena to the judiciary. Regulation and taxation of
products that would otherwise be politically impossible becomes tempting when the
debate can be framed as a legal dispute where so-called damages are owed by an
unpopular industry to the public."); Viscusi, Postmortem, supra note 51, at 544 (arguing that
taxation and regulation of cigarettes should be left to legislative process, and that state
attorneys general were primarily concerned "with the dollar amount reaped by the states
as part of the settlement, which is their principal area of responsibility, rather than
formulating broadly based regulatory initiatives"). My focus is not on the separation of
powers among the government branches, but rather on the separation of roles between
government lawyers and private lawyers. Notwithstanding the separation of powers
concerns, attorneys general are far more politically accountable than private plaintiffs'
lawyers. See Meier, supra note 114, at 3 (noting concerns about exercise of power by private
lawyers who "are not answerable to the public they supposedly represent"). The press
often conflates these two issues - separation of powers between the legislative and judicial
branches, and concerns about trial lawyers exercising policy-making power. See, e.g.,
Cohen, supra note 5, at 26.
" See Coffee, Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 11, at 726-27 ("Convenient and comforting
as it is to view the attorney only through this nostalgic lens of fiduciary analysis, a fixation
on this mode of analysis is likely to blind us to the real issues relating to the incentives and
misincentives that the law today creates for the plaintiff's attorney.").
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preclusive effect of a judgment, or through the gathering and
dissemination of documents and other information.
If government litigation proceeds to a final judgment after issues have
been litigated and determined, then the judgment may have an issue
preclusive effect on subsequent private litigation. For example, courts
may deem a determination that a product is defective or that a defendant
violated the securities or antitrust laws conclusive in later cases, as a
matter of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion. 13 This potential for
issue preclusion gives rise to asymmetrical bargaining positions in
government lawsuit settlement negotiations, as it does whenever the first
of multiple related lawsuits against a common defendant approaches
trial. The government possesses a bargaining advantage, because
defendants favor settlements to avoid the risk of an adverse judgment
that would have issue preclusive effect in subsequent private lawsuits.TM
In the Microsoft antitrust litigation, the risk of issue preclusion gave
Microsoft a powerful incentive to prefer settlement.13' One suspects that
Judge Jackson was counting in part on this incentive when he issued his
findings of fact and then gave the parties time to negotiate a settlement
before entry of a final judgment.1m Not only did Judge Jackson's findings
133 See Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332-33 (1979) (giving issue preclusive
effect, in private securities class action, to determination in government civil enforcement
action that defendants made material misrepresentations in proxy statement).
" See Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REv. 945, 956-59
(1998). Issue preclusion applies only to final judgments. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTs § 13, § 27 & comment k (1982).
13' A number of observers noted this at the time. See, e.g., Seven Suits So Far as Pressure
on Microsoft is Escalating, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1999, at C6 (noting that private class action
suits would "reinforce pressure on the software company to reach an out-of-court
settlement with the Justice Department," because "settlement would make it far more
difficult for private plaintiffs to use the judge's findings to build a foundation for a case
against Microsoft"); Segal, supra note 26 ("Indeed, the threat of an outpouring of lawsuits is
one reason that experts believe Microsoft might try to settle the case in the coming
months.").
13 Judge Jackson appointed Judge Richard Posner as a mediator, but months of talks
ended with no settlement agreement. Some speculated that Microsoft and the Justice
Department were able to agree, but the state attorneys general were unwilling. See Text of
Statement Issued by Judge Posner, reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2000, at 22 (stating, after
mediation failed to produce agreement, "I particularly want to emphasize that the collapse
of the mediation is not due to any lack of skill, flexibility, energy, determination or
professionalism on the part of the Department of Justice and Microsoft Corporation."). The
chosen mediator was certainly well-positioned to point out the incentive for Microsoft, not
that it needed any pointing out. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 576-78
(4th ed. 1992) (discussing incentives created by asymmetry of offensive nonmutual issue
preclusion).
After the findings of fact but before final judgment, Microsoft's incentive derived
from the window created by the final judgment requirement for issue preclusion. Until
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of fact practically invite consumers to file class actions, 37 they also
spelled out emphatically the court's factual determinations, giving
Microsoft fair warning of the issue preclusive effect should the parties
fail to settle.
The skilled government lawyer understands this issue preclusion risk
as one of the strategic incentives at play for the defendant in settlement
negotiations. I would suggest, however, that the government lawyer
should consider issue preclusion as more than a bargaining chip. The
government expends public resources in pursuing lawsuits against
wrongdoers not only to achieve a particular result as a matter of
settlement or remedy, but also in part to reach a public determination of
the matter.'s Public determination of a matter, in the form of a final
judgment based on issue determinations, constitutes a public good both
in the economic sense of the term 39 and in the sense of an overall benefit
to the people. When government lawyers decide whether to settle with a
defendant, they should consider the settlement's impact in foreclosing
issue preclusion for private litigants. While they should pursue
attractive settlement options with defendants where the public benefit to
be obtained by the settlement outweighs the value of a public
determination, they should not ignore the risk of inefficiency and
inconsistency engendered by a pre-judgment settlement.
Beyond the preclusive effect of adjudication, government litigation
generates information that private litigants use in their own lawsuits.
Even if the Microsoft case had settled before final judgment, thus
foreclosing any issue preclusion, it would have provided a tremendous
boost to private consumer class actions. The government's pleadings,
evidence, and trial arguments provide a roadmap for private litigators to
follow. 14
entry of a final judgment, the findings of fact most likely were not entitled to preclusive
effect. Thus, there was a period when Microsoft knew the near-certain outcome of trial but
retained a strong chance to avoid the issue preclusive effect of that outcome. See
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 (stating finality requirement). There is some
chance that the findings of fact would nevertheless have been deemed issue preclusive
against Microsoft, following recent cases that have relaxed the finality requirement for
issue preclusion under the doctrine of practical finality. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL.,
FED. PRAc. & PROc., § 4434 (1981 & Supp. 2000).
" See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
138 See generally Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing that
settlement is not necessarily better than judgment and should not be encouraged).
1 See Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 134, at 956-57 n.42 (discussing
issue adjudication as public good in economic sense, and accompanying free rider
problem).
" Materials are easily available to plaintiffs' lawyers at the Justice Department's
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Government documentary discovery, especially, can facilitate the
pursuit of claims by private plaintiffs. Not only does the government
action provide plaintiffs with valuable information, but access to that
information greatly reduces plaintiffs' costs. For example, documents
gathered and culled by Minnesota's lawyers in their famously thorough
tobacco discovery14 proved critical in subsequent private litigation, most
notably in the Engle class action.14 However, the availability of such
information depends in large part on government lawyers' insistence on
making discovered information public, and their unwillingness to agree
to restrictive confidentiality provisions. Minnesota's lawyers
appropriately treated their discovery as the generation of public
information rather than purely as the amassing of litigation advantage.14'
B. Public Compromise of Private Claims
In settlement negotiations between the government and defendants,
the government may be tempted to play a valuable but dangerous
bargaining chip: the power to compromise future private claims through
changes in the governing law. It is more complicated than that, of
course. Restricting private claims would generally require legislative
action, so such restrictions cannot simply be offered by a negotiating
government lawyer.14 Moreover, the litigating entity may differ from
the government entity with power to affect the private claims'
Nevertheless, concerns over attempts to compromise private claims as
website. See Antitrust Case Filings, U.S. Department of Justice: Antitrust Division, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/msindex.htm (n.d.).
1 Minnesota lawyer Michael Ciresi's document discovery in the tobacco case was so
thorough that other plaintiffs' lawyers made fun of it. According to one account, attorney
Ron Motley said of Ciresi and his thirty-three million pages of documents, "He doesn't
even know half of what he's got. We targeted our discovery. That idiot just asked for
everything, and now he's stuck with it." ZEGART, supra note 5, at 319.
", See supra text accompanying note 65.
... When Minnesota overcame the defendants' attorney-client privilege argument, for
example, Attorney General Humphrey announced, "This is the truth that we have been
seeking. Now the American people will know, and justice is going to be done." RYBAK &
PHELPS, supra note 126, at 332. The transparently political tone of Humphrey's
proclamation drives home the point that political incentives can and should lead
government lawyers to make litigation decisions with broader interests in mind than those
of the claimants in any particular lawsuit.
1" Thus, the parties to the 1997 global tobacco settlement proposal understood that
they needed Congressional action to effectuate the litigation-restricting provisions of their
agreement.
" The municipalities suing handgun manufacturers, for example, are in no position to
offer the manufacturers legal protection from private claims, even if such protection could
be afforded by changes in state or federal law.
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part of a settlement of a government lawsuit, given the nature of "the
government" as a litigant, are not far-fetched. Indeed, such compromise
of private claims very nearly materialized in the tobacco litigation.
In the global tobacco settlement proposal negotiated in June 1997 by
the tobacco defendants, state attorneys general and others,'4 the parties
agreed to powerful limits on lawsuits by tobacco plaintiffs. Although
that settlement proposal ultimately fell apart in Congress, it warrants
examination as an extraordinary attempt to compromise private tort
claims in pursuit of a government litigation settlement. Naturally, as a
settlement of the state governments' claims, the global settlement
proposal would have barred subsequent claims by the states.147 In
addition, however, the settlement would have prohibited private
plaintiffs from bringing tobacco lawsuits as class actions. Nor would
plaintiffs have been allowed to use joinder, consolidation, or other
procedural devices to address tobacco claims other than by filing
individual complaints. 149 The settlement would have restricted the use of
certain evidence in subsequent suits, 5° as well as limiting who could sue
and who could be sued." Moreover, the settlement would have placed
annual caps on the total amount of compensatory damages tobacco
defendants would be required to pay,112 and would have barred punitive
damages entirely.9 Compromise of private claims and procedural
opportunities in settlement of government litigation raises serious
concerns.
Compromise of private compensatory claims, whether by outright bar
or by limitations such as the annual damages cap in the proposed
tobacco settlement, should not be used to settle government lawsuits
without adequate provision for the compensation of claimants. As
Professors Hanoch Dagan and James White have shown, the proposed
"Proposed Tobacco Industry Settlement, at http://stic.neu.edu/settlement/6-20-
settle.htm (June 20, 1997).
See id. tit.VIII.A.1.
See id. tit.VIII.B.2.
See id. ("no class actions, joinder, aggregations, consolidations, extrapolations or
other devices to resolve cases other than on the basis of individual trials, without
defendant's consent").
" See id. tit.VIII.B.7 (barring discovery or use of evidence that tobacco companies
developed reduced risk tobacco products, to prove their knowledge of health risks).
... Plaintiffs would have been limited to individuals and their heirs, except for third-
party payor suits filed before June 9,1997. See id. tit.VIII.B.5. Defendants would have been
limited to manufacturers and their agents. See id.
.2 See id. tit.VIII.B.9 -VIII.B.11.
"" See id. tit.VIH.B.1.
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tobacco settlement did not adequately provide for compensation, despite
possible indirect benefits to individual tobacco plaintiffs.' T Dagan and
White persuasively argue that "governmental interference with the
compensatory awards of injured citizens in the name of the public good
cannot be deemed just unless it is accompanied by compensation.'
Settlements ordinarily require compromising claims for less than full
compensation to account for the uncertainty of recovery. Particularly
given the history of plaintiff failures in the tobacco litigation, something
less than full damages could be deemed adequate compensation in a
settlement. The 1997 global settlement proposal, however, offered little
if any value to individual tobacco plaintiffs. It would have, in essence,
filled government coffers by selling impediments to plaintiffs' claims.
Punitive damages raise somewhat different issues. Given the nature
and purpose of punitive damages, plaintiffs' claims of entitlement to
punitive damages are much weaker than claims of entitlement with
regard to compensatory damages. Although punitive damages arguably
serve a partly compensatory function in some cases, compensation fares
poorly as a justification for punitive damage awards."" Some
commentators suggest that deterrence and retribution may create an• . .157
entitlement to punitive damages. To whatever extent victims can claim
an entitlement to see the wrongdoer punished, that entitlement is met as
long as sufficient punishment is inflicted on the defendant, and does not
lead to the conclusion that the victim has a right to receive a punitive
damages payment. Thus, in determining whether it is legitimate for the
government to compromise private punitive damages claims in
settlement of government litigation, as the proposed tobacco settlement
would have done, the essential question is whether the defendant has
been adequately punished by the government ltigation.lss
Sometimes the compromise of claims masquerades as procedural
reform. The 1997 proposed tobacco settlement did not bar tobacco
lawsuits outright, but would have prohibited certain procedural
mechanisms. Pursuant to the settlement, private plaintiffs would have
been unable to use class actions or other joinder or consolidation
procedures to aggregate claims against the tobacco companies. In
See Dagan & White, supra note 2, at 364-65, 368-69.
155 Id. at 414.
15 See id. at 418-19.
See id. at 420-24.
15 For an argument that the proposed tobacco settlement did not punish the
defendants enough to justify the settlement provision barring punitive damages, see
Humphrey, supra note 45, app. at 419-20.
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essence, the settlement was an effort to enact substance-specific
procedural reforms for tobacco cases that could not be accomplished in
the context of broader class action reform.
As a matter of litigation policy it serves no valid purpose to prohibit
tobacco class actions across the board. Class action rules leave plenty of
room for courts to reject tobacco class actions where the courts decide
that individual lawsuits would be the superior method. 9 Indeed many
courts have refused to certify class actions in tobacco cases."W In the
relatively rare case where a court decides that class action would be the
superior method of resolving the dispute, it is difficult to see the
rationale for allowing individual lawsuits but not the class action.61 As
others have noted, and as was transparently the goal of the defendants,
the main effect of a prohibition on class actions would be to increase the
cost to plaintiffs of bringing tobacco claims, and thus to decrease the
likelihood that lawyers would be willing to make the financial
112commitment to pursue such claims. While concessions in pursuit of
settlement are to be expected, there is something troubling about a
concession that merely enhances inefficiency.
If government entities settle their claims by compromising the claims
of citizens, as they sought to do in the proposed tobacco settlement,
those citizens would have a reasonable argument that the settlement was
an unconstitutional taking entitling them to just compensation. This
argument is laid out powerfully by Professors Dagan and White.1 As
Dagan and White put it, "a strict takings doctrine is the only viable
protection for citizens from the dangers inherent in governmental
interference with their claims against injurious industries. " 1 To grant
that citizens may have a viable takings claim if the government
compromises citizens' claims without just compensation, however, is not
' See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3) (permitting certification of Rule 23(b)(3) money damages
class action only upon finding that "a class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy").
"' See cases cited supra note 55.
161 As Richard Daynard and Graham Kelder put it, "[t]he only possible purpose of
eliminating these legal devices in the settlement proposal was to make it impossible for
plaintiff attorneys to bring, or state courts to process, cases against the tobacco industry in
an efficient and cost-effective manner." Richard A. Daynard & Graham E. Kelder, The
Many Virtues of Tobacco Litigation, TRIAL, Nov. 1998, at 34, 38.
" See Humphrey, supra note 45, app. at 417-19.
" See Dagan & White, supra note 2, at 406-24. See also Gideon Kanner, Smoke 'n' Mirrors
in the Tobacco Settlement, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 15, 1997, at A21. But see Bianchini, supra note 90,
at 735-39 (arguing that provisions in proposed tobacco settlement did not constitute
unconstitutional taking).I" Dagan & White, supra note 2, at 424.
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to commend takings law as a sensible avenue for resolving claims of
widespread harm. Lawsuits by injured persons against government
entities would be a remarkably inefficient and roundabout way to
resolve claims against an injurious industry. The point of allowing such
takings claims would not be to encourage the use of a takings framework
for mass litigation, but rather to deter government entities from
compromising the claims of private parties without providing adequate
compensation.
The fundamental danger in allowing government lawyers to use
private claims as a bargaining chip is that negotiating parties will often
prefer to resolve their dispute by shifting costs to absent third parties if
possible. 16 With the cost-bearers absent from the bargaining table,
however, such resolutions are unlikely to be optimal for society as a
whole.' 66 Thus, the question is whether potential private plaintiffs are
adequately represented by the government's lawyers in a settlement
negotiation between government entities and defendants.67 Given the
duty of government lawyers to represent their government entities,
rather than the interests of any particular individual or class, the
representative nature of government lawsuits cannot substitute for the
representation of plaintiffs' interests by their own individually retained
' David Luban explains this idea well:
The point is simple: two parties trying to apportion a loss are most likely to reach
agreement if they can find a way to shift the burden to a third party who is not
present at the bargaining table. For example, the parties to an environmental
dispute may settle it through an agreement that a chemical company will dispose
of waste at sites purchased in a remote community with no political clout.
Similarly, a law firm may settle a malpractice claim with the Resolution Trust
Corporation by agreeing not to contest liability provided that the settlement is
within the firm's insurance limits, or a labor union and an employer may settle a
controversy by passing the losses on to consumers.
David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2626
(1995).
" See id. (referring to settlements that create "public bads" rather than "public goods").
167 In an analysis of the 1997 tobacco agreement, one commentator focused on the
question of adequate representation, and found that the government lawyers exceeded the
bounds of their powers in trying to negotiate away the rights of potential plaintiffs: "The
attorneys general who drafted the tobacco agreement were likely without power to grant
the tobacco industry all of the concessions contained in the document. In settling, they
acted as representatives not only of the states, but also of all private litigants with existing
or future claims against the tobacco industry in the United States." Bianchini, supra note
90, at 729. Ms. Bianchini notes that the doctrine of parens patriae, which allows states to sue
on behalf of its citizens in certain situations, does not authorize the state to sue when it is"merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens." Id. at 729-30 (quoting
Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665 (1976)).
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attorneys or class counsel.' 68
C. Private Lawyers with Public Duties
Given the distinctly public role of the government lawyer, it can be
troubling to see government entities hire private litigators to pursue
matters of public importance. For one thing, government use of private
lawyers raises concerns about accountability and corruption. Such
contracts are susceptible to charges of political patronage, as some
observers noted in the Mississippi tobacco litigation and others.9 These
concerns, however, are not unique to government's litigation functions,
but rather apply to virtually every example of government
outsourcing.' 70 Thus, accountability and corruption concerns should be
addressed as matters of decision-making authority, bidding processes,171
and government ethics regulation, and need not be addressed here as a
particular problem of public and private lawyer roles.
The government, like other clients, can hire outside lawyers on hourly,
flat, or contingent fees. When private lawyers are hired by the
government on an hourly or flat fee, it raises typical outsourcing issues,
but need not present major problems of government legal policy. The
use of David Boies as trial lawyer in the government's Microsoft case, for
" See supra text accompanying notes 118-132 (comparing the responsibilities of public
and private lawyers); see also Bianchini, supra note 90, at 726 ("[Ilt is questionable whether
the people who negotiated and drafted the Proposed [Global Tobacco] Settlement
adequately represented the interests of the individuals that the document would have
bound.").
" Some observers expressed concern about Attorney General Michael Moore's hiring
of Richard Scruggs for Mississippi's tobacco lawsuit, despite Scruggs' strong reputation as
a trial lawyer. Scruggs was Moore's long-time friend and fraternity brother, as well as the
leading contributor to Moore's political campaigns. See Mississippi Panel Discussion, supra
note 36, at 856; see also Lammi, supra note 77 (raising concerns about campaign
contributions and choice of lawyers in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas). More broadly,
Professor Lester Brickman has charged that "[iun most states, the hiring was done on a pay-
to-play basis," and that "many of the lawyers were selected on the basis of campaign
contributions that they made to the state attorneys general." Fordham Symposium, supra
note 42, at 2849.
1' See Jack M. Sabatino, Privatization and Punitives: Should Government Contractors Share
the Sovereign's Immunity from Exemplary Damages?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 177 ("Unlike elected
politicians, private contractors are at least one step removed from the democratic process
and are apt to be more attentive to their own bottom-line financial success than they are to
catering to the popular will. For a host of reasons, government itself is prone to do an
inadequate job in supervising those hired firms.").
1 See Cupp, supra note 102, at 699 (favoring use of "Sunshine Act" to require open and
competitive bidding for lawyers seeking to represent government entities (citing AM.
LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNCIL, Private Attorney Retention Sunshine Act, Jan. 1, 1999)).
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example, did not create any serious trouble in terms of the roles of public
and private lawyers. There was no indication that Boies functioned
differently in that matter than if he had been a full-time Justice
Department employee, except that he had more experience in complex
trials than any of the Justice Department antitrust lawyers.17 Nor does
the vernment's use of pro bono lawyers, as in Chicago's handgun
suit, raise major concerns.
With contingent fees, the problem is much more serious. The primary
reason contingent fee arrangements should not be used for government
lawsuits is that government legal authority should not be given to
someone with a direct financial stake in a matter.174 In contrast to the
government lawyer's incentives, the contingent fee lawyer's incentives
are more entrepreneurial than political. Generally, the contingent fee
lawyer's primary incentive is to maximize the monetary recovery, which
corresponds with the primary interest of most private plaintiffs.
However, the government's interest and the public good are not
necessarily advanced by inflicting the maximum penalty on
defendants. 175 For example, whereas political incentives would more
likely drive government lawyers to insist upon making information•. 176
public, a contingent fee lawyer faces a powerful incentive to negotiate
17 See Bumiller, supra note 3. See also Robert A. Levy, Hired Guns Corral Contingent Fee
Bonanza, LEGAL TIMEs, Feb. 1, 1999, at 27 [hereinafter Levy, Hired Guns] (noting that hourly
fee agreements "might be justified to acquire unique outside competence or experience").
" See Van Voris, supra note 83.
" See Norton, supra note 81, at 8.
'"' One commentator emphasized some of the points on which the interests of the state
and contingent fee lawyers may diverge:
Lawyers relying on a contingency fee recovery will invariably have interests
adverse to what should be the larger goal of the state - seeking justice.... The
financial stake might compel the plaintiffs' attorneys to make day-to-day
decisions on matters such as discovery, the use of witnesses or documents, and
general litigation strategy in a manner markedly different that would the state
lawyers. It might be, at some point in the litigation, in the best interests of a state
to pursue injunctive, rather than monetary relief, seek one or two of the claims
but not all of them, settle the suit, or even abandon it. All of these developments
could be contrary to the private lawyers' maximum recovery interest.
Lammi, supra note 77.
" Minnesota attorney general Skip Humphrey opposed the national tobacco
settlement in part because he believed that "[tihe document disclosure provisions were
weak and uncertain." Humphrey, supra note 45, at 402. Similarly, Mississippi attorney
general Michael Moore has spoken of his state's role in making information public:
[Olne of the most important things that we've done - and I'm really proud of our
state because Mississippi almost became the sanctuary for the truth. I mean,
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with defendants for higher monetary payments conditioned on
confidentiality." 7  As Chicago's deputy corporation counsel explained
when the city decided not to retain contingent fee lawyers for its
handgun suit, "It is very important to us that this case be driven by the
public policy issues.... We didn't want someone who would be jacking
up the highest damages for their contingent fee. "17' Another
commentator makes the point by example: "Imagine a state attorney
general corralling criminals on a contingency basis or state troopers paid
per speeding ticket."'79 Just as contingent fees are prohibited in criminal
defense or divorce representation" due to concerns that such fees would
create incentives contrary to public policy and the client's interests, 18' so
should contingent fees be disfavored or prohibited for government
litigation where they create incentives inconsistent with the duties of
when we filed our lawsuit, one of the main things that we wanted to do was to
get the truth out of the industry. And if you will remember the Bryan Williams
documents, which frankly probably broke open this thing. That guy comes to
Mississippi and brings those documents. Dick [Scruggs] and I - we get them out
all over the world and take them to the Justice Department so that through the
litigation the truth gets out.
Mississippi Panel Discussion, supra note 36, at 869-70.
" Cf. Anthony J. Basinsky, "Sunshine" Laws Bar Secret Settlements, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 24,
1997, at B10 ("Some plaintiffs... may use the confidentiality issue as a bargaining chip.").
It is not clear whether monitoring by government clients can sufficiently constrain lawyers
accustomed to entrepreneurial litigation. I acknowledge that government clients'
monitoring of contingent fee lawyers undoubtedly exceeds client monitoring in most class
actions.
178 Van Voris, supra note 83 (quoting deputy corporation counsel Lawrence Rosenthal).
" Levy, Hired Guns, supra note 172.
'80 The relevant ABA model rule provides:
A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:
(1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is
contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or
support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or
(2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCr R. 1.5(d). See also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C) (prohibiting contingent fees in criminal cases); MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 ("contingent fee arrangements in domestic relation cases are
rarely justified").
I" See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT 60-62 (4th ed. 1999)
(noting concern that contingent fees may discourage criminal defense counsel from plea
bargaining or from introducing mitigating evidence establishing lesser included offense,
and may discourage matrimonial lawyers from supporting reconciliation of spouses).
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A second reason to disfavor contingent fees is that they allow
government entities to pursue litigation without having to budget for it.
Of course, from the vantage point of resource-strapped government
entities, this is the primary argument in favor of contingent fees.'8 The
classic justification for contingent fees is to provide access to lawyers for
clients unable to afford hourly or flat fees. T& While government entities
hardly fit the usual image of the indigent client, the political
unworkability of paying hourly fees for certain litigation initiatives may
put government entities in a somewhat analogous position. Without
contingent fees, it seems likely that the state tobacco lawsuits would not
have been pursued with such vigor, and perhaps not filed at all.""
" Unlike the prohibitions on criminal and matrimonial contingent fees, which are
contained in lawyers' ethics rules, see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d), any
prohibitions or restrictions on government contingent fees may be better suited for
legislation. While both types of restrictions address problematic incentives created by
contingent fees in particular types of cases, the criminal and matrimonial restrictions are
sensibly understood as concerns about lawyer overreaching, whereas the government
restriction is better understood as a concern about how government entities go about their
legal business. See infra text accompanying notes 183-187 (discussing government use of
contingent fee lawyers as separation of powers problem).
18 The private lawyer who was lead counsel for the State of Florida in its tobacco
lawsuit observed that the Florida attorney general's office had neither the funding nor the
personnel to handle the case: "They couldn't get any money. The state in our contract set
forth the fact that the state could not handle this litigation. The legislature would not
appropriate any money." Fordham Symposium, supra note 42, at 2856 (quoting Robert
Montgomery). Similarly, the private attorney who was lead trial lawyer for Minnesota
commented, "I never saw one legislature, except California, say, 'Wait a minute. Let's
appropriate money for these lawsuits. Let's spend money on this. This is such a good
deal."' Id. at 2839 (quoting Michael Ciresi). See also Lammi, supra note 77 ("The hope of
avoiding asking the legislature to fund controversial litigation, especially litigation created
and pursued by private lawyers, is what made contingency fee arrangements so appealing
in the Medicaid suits.").
'14 See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS 528 (1986). Indigence is not,
however, a prerequisite for contingent fees. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-389 (1994) ("The fact that a client can afford to compensate
the lawyer on another basis does not render a contingent fee arrangement for such a client
unethical.").
18 See Fordham Symposium, supra note 42, at 2840-41 ("there are industries that will
not be taken on, there are cases that will not be brought, unless we allow contingency fees")
(quoting Barbara Gillers). Mississippi's attorney general described his pitch to the private
lawyers: "Here's the deal, I need you to sue the tobacco companies for me, and you are
going to have to pay all the expenses and it may be as much as $10 or $12 million, and you
have very little chance of winning. Nobody's ever collected a penny before, and it's going
to get tough. And they're going to sue you. It's going to get horrible. Are you in or are
you out?" See Mississippi Panel Discussion, supra note 36, at 857 (quoting Michael Moore).
[Vol. 34:1
Coattail Class Actions
The problem is that government checks and balances depend largely
on purse-strings, and contingent fees make those purse-strings disappear
or at least put the strings beyond the reach of the legislative branch.
Ordinarily, if an attorney general's office wants to pursue significant
litigation, it must allocate resources to that litigation rather than to
something else. If the attorney general's office is unable or unwilling to
do so, then it must seek additional resources from the legislature. The
budget thus allows the legislative branch to check the zealousness of
executive branch lawyers. Contingent fees allow the attorney general's
office to pursue litigation without worrying about the budget, and thus
without the immediacy of budget-based political accountability.
187
The tobacco litigation is the leading example of government use of
contingent fee lawyers. The perceived success of the tobacco litigation is
likely to spur the use of such arrangements for future lawsuits. The
tobacco model may be misleading, however. I contend that contingent
fee lawyers should not be used to pursue government litigation, even if
the tobacco litigation is viewed in hindsight as a successful use of such
arrangements. The tobacco litigation involved three factors that
presented the strongest possible scenario for government use of
contingent fee lawyers. First, in the tobacco litigation, the risk of non-
recovery was high. At least for the earlier states to sue, the history of
tobacco lawsuits suggested a low chance of success.18 Second, enormous
resources were needed to pursue the litigation seriously,189 enough to
" For an example of a legislative attempt to derail executive branch pursuit of tobacco
litigation, see Eric Pianin, Federal Tobacco Lawsuit Is Targeted, WASH. POST, June 9, 2000, at
A16 (describing attempt by members of Congress to cut off funding for Justice
Department's recoupment lawsuit against tobacco industry).
'1 See Norton, supra note 81, at 8 ("By the use of contingent fee lawyers, Attorneys
General gain an unparalleled ability to determine the size of their own agency budgets.
Unless specific statutes are adopted, such as those recently passed in Texas and North
Dakota, the Attorney General can hire a number of law firms without needing to get
budgetary approval from the legislature and the Governor."). As the attorney general of
Alabama puts it, "If government officials want to pursue novel and risky litigation, then
they should have to justify the use of the taxpayers' money for that venture. Public officials
should not be allowed, to create an illusion of a risk-free shot at some kind of lawsuit
lottery." William H. Pryor, Jr., A Comparison of Abuses and Reforms of Class Actions and
Multigovernment Lawsuits, 74 TuL. L. REv. 1885, 1917 (2000).
"8 See Humphrey, supra note 45, at 398 ("At the time, the cons [of suing the tobacco
industry] were a lot more obvious than the pros.... The industry had the reputation of
being invincible in court.... In short, the decision to sue appeared long on risk and short
on reward."). See also supra text accompanying note 31.
'" The law firm retained by Minnesota, for example, spent nearly $30 million in lawyer
time, in addition to $5 million for expert witnesses and $5 million for other expenses. See
RYBAK & PHELPS, supra note 126, at 443.
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daunt even a state attorney general's office, particularly given the high
chance of failure. Finally, the tobacco litigation was extremely high
profile. It was watched closely by the press, the public, and government
officials.
The first two factors may render litigation well-suited for contingent
fees as a general matter, but it is the third criterion - the litigation's high-
profile status - that addresses the problematic incentives of contingent
fee lawyers handling public lawsuits. In high-profile litigation, political
incentives' 9° may drive litigation decisions notwithstanding the retention
of contingent fee lawyers. Thus, the fact that Minnesota and other states
made tobacco documents public, despite their representation by
contingent fee lawyers,'91 does not mean that the same would necessarily
happen in lawsuits that lack the sustained public and political attention
that characterized the tobacco cases. In sum, contingent fee
arrangements by government entities are problematic, and even if their
use in the tobacco litigation is viewed as a success, the use of such fees
should not be extended to other matters.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR COATTAIL CLASS ACTIONS
Just as we should think about government lawsuits in light of the
private class actions that benefit from them, we should think about class
actions in light of the government litigation that lays their groundwork.
In particular, we should think about whether coattail class actions add
anything of value, and we should think about implications for attorney
fee awards.
A. The Value of Coattail Class Actions
Barely had the ink dried on Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson's findings
of fact in the Microsoft antitrust trial when plaintiff's lawyers began
filing class actions against the software giant. One could hardly ask for a
better portrait of everything that is predatory about class-action
plaintiff's lawyers. 1
92
1 By "political incentives," I do not mean to convey negative connotations, as in "they
did it for political reasons rather than for the public good." Rather, I simply mean the
incentives that are built into our system of government, many of which are essential for the
proper functioning of government institutions.
" See supra note 176 (quoting attorneys general Skip Humphrey and Michael Moore on
their insistence on making documents public).19 Editorial, Actions Without Class, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1999, at A38.
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The most fundamental question about coattail class actions is whether
they serve the public good or merely enrich the lawyers. Should class
action lawyers who piggyback on the success of government litigation be
applauded, or reviled as "tort parasites"? 9  A parasite derives
sustenance from another organism without making any useful
contribution. Coattail class actions can be considered parasitic, in the
sense of adding nothing of value, only if one objects to the substantive
law that underlies both the government and private litigation, or if one
believes that government actions fully satisfy the goals of that
substantive law. The relationship between government litigation and
coattail class actions is better described as one of symbiosis, an
association of mutual advantage. 194 Not only do private class actions
often advance government litigation,'95 but the two complement each
other as deterrence and compensation mechanisms.19 6
For victims of widespread harm, compensation generally comes from
private rather than government litigation. Particularly where individual
damages are too small to justify individual lawsuits, a class action can be
the best procedural mechanism for obtaining compensation. 7  As for
' Editorial, Judge Posner's Brief, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1999, at A22. See also Walter
Olson, A Microsoft Suit with a Sure Winner, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1999, at A27 (commenting
that only lawyers are likely to benefit from class actions against Microsoft).
194 Professor John Coffee suggested this description in his analysis of plaintiffs' lawyers
as private attorneys general. See Coffee, Private Attorney General, supra note 1, at 225
("[Alithough some have characterized such 'tag-along' private enforcement actions as'parasitic,' it may be more accurate to describe the relationship between public and private
enforcer as symbiotic.").
193 See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
16 Professor Coffee has argued that some value is added by private actions that
piggyback on government work.
"This phenomenon of 'free riding' by the private plaintiff on governmental
enforcement efforts is by no means without social utility: Fiist, it does escalate
the penalty structure above the modest fine schedules that are authorized by law
(and nullified by inflation). Absent these private actions, the monetary penalties
for antitrust and securities fraud plainly would be insufficient to deter. Second,
it often may be more efficient for public agencies to concentrate on detection (an
area where they have the comparative advantage because of their superior
investigative resources) and leave the actual litigation of the case to private
enforcers, who are frequently more experienced in litigation tactics."
Coffee, Private Attorney General, supra note 1, at 224-25.
197 The success of class actions for compensating victims depends, to some extent, on
the vigilance of judges in reviewing class settlements and attorneys' fees. As many others
have observed, without careful judicial supervision, class actions may result in nearly
worthless coupon settlements for the class with disproportionately large fees for the
lawyers. See, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER Er AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN, ExEcUTIvE SUMMARY 32-35 (1999) (recommending judges award
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deterrence, even the pounding of a major government lawsuit may be
inadequate to achieve the correct deterrence level if it does not force the
defendant to internalize the costs of the harm imposed. Private class
actions, more than government litigation, compel defendants to pay the
costs of injuries.'98 Even though a coattail class action does not serve the"private attorney general" purpose of searching out otherwise
undetected violators and enforcing the law against them,' 99 that does not
mean such class actions fail to bring deterrence closer to an optimal
level.2® Thus, when Bill Gates accuses that "[tihese class-action cases are
just piling on,"20' our question should be whether they are piling on
something of value that is not redundant of what was achieved by the
government action.
Not only do coattail class actions add something of value to
government actions in terms of compensation and deterrence, but they
are superior to non-coattail class actions as a matter of both efficiency
and legitimacy. For the critics who call coattail class actions "parasitic"
or "predatory" or "piling on," one wonders whether they would be any
less critical of the same class actions if they were filed without prior
government action. In terms of efficiency, prior government litigation
makes the private litigation cheaper by issue preclusion, legal analysis,
and factual development. 2 2 Additionally, if courts properly take these
advantages into account when awarding attorneys' fees, 203 then the
efficiency savings should not, as critics complain, merely enrich the
lawyers.
fees based on funds actually disbursed or coupons actually redeemed).
19 As one commentator stated in the wake of the Engle punitive damages verdict, "It
was one thing when cities and states started to line up to sue the industry. It is another if
the millions of Americans who believe they became ill from smoking can start lining up to
file claims." Barry Meier, Industry Crosses Troubling Line, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2000, at All.
1 See Coffee, Private Attorney General, supra note 1, at 220-223 (noting that when
plaintiffs' lawyers piggyback on government work, those plaintiffs' lawyers do nothing to
increase probability of detection of violations of law). See also Coffee, Plaintiffs Attorney,
supra note 11, at 692 ("The strength of private enforcement is that it supplements the
enforcement resources of the state by creating incentives for a potentially unlimited
number of enforcers to enter the field and search out violations of law.").
2" By raising defendants' costs and liability, coattail class actions add to the deterrent
impact of government litigation, contrary to The Washington Post's charge that, "Nor do the
suits act - as class actions sometimes do - as a check on corporate behavior, since these
cases bring nothing new to the table but merely seek to cash in on the findings from
preexisting Justice Department litigation." Editorial, supra note 7.
202 Brinkley & Lohr, supra note 20, at C2.
20 See supra text accompanying notes 133-143.
203 See infra text accompanying notes 206-216.
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Not only are coattail class actions more efficient than non-coattail class
actions, one should also expect that they are less likely to be frivolous.
Given the political checks on the actions of attorneys general and other
government lawyers, and given that government lawyer compensation is
not driven by litigation outcomes to the same extent as private lawyer
compensation, one would expect government lawyers to be somewhat
less likely than private litigators to pursue litigation without a
reasonable basis. When a private plaintiff's lawyer files a class action,
the existence of prior government litigation based on the same liability
allegations, especially if that government litigation succeeded, lends at
least some additional credibility to the class action complaint.
The usefulness of coattail class actions is less clear with regard to
punitive damages. A reasonable argument might be made that courts
should bar punitive damages if there has already been a sufficient civil
enforcement remedy imposed against the defendant for the same
conduct. However, courts have been unreceptive to such arguments
where defendants object to punitive damages after having suffered prior
punitive damage awards or criminal liability.204  At least when
determining the amount of punitive damages, courts should consider the
extent to which prior government litigation has punished the
defendant.20 5
B. Attorneys' Fees
Lawyers who file coattail class actions should nearly always earn
lower fees than they would have earned had they achieved the same
result without the benefit of prior government litigation. In general, fees
for class counsel are determined by the court, to be awarded out of the
common fund created by the judgment.2°6 Courts use two different
methods in awarding such fees: the lodestar method and the percentage-
of-outcome method. Under either method, courts should award lower
See Howard M. Erichson, Enough is Enough: Solving the Problem of Punitive Overkill in
Multiple-Plaintiff Litigation, 152 N.J.L.J. 246 (Apr. 20, 1998).
In the punitive damages phase of the Engle Florida smokers' class action, the
defendants argued that they were already paying billions of dollars to the states, see Barry
Meier, Jury's Action Raises Concerns for Tobacco Industry, N.Y. TIMEs, July 16, 2000, at 19, but
the jury concluded that the state settlements had not sent a sufficiently strong message. See
Bragg & Kershaw, supra note 69, at 1 (reporting, based on interview with jury foreman, that
jurors wanted to send powerful message, and that "[s]ettlements with the states that had
challenged the industry had not sent that strong message, but the award of punitive
damages.., would, the jury hoped").
216 See HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS AcTIoNs § 14.03 (3d ed.
1992).
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fees for coattail class actions than they would award in the absence of
prior government litigation.
Under the "lodestar method," class counsel fees ordinarily should be
lower in coattail class actions than in class actions that do not follow
government litigation. The lodestar method involves multiplying
reasonable hours by a reasonable rate.20 By taking advantage of work
accomplished by government lawyers, the litigation should take fewer
hours of work by class counsel. This is borne out by the experience of
plaintiffs' lawyers in tobacco cases tried after the breakthroughs of the
state cases, 208 in contrast with the experience of tobacco plaintiffs'
lawyers just a few years earlier.209 The amount of fees paid to private
lawyers handling the state tobacco lawsuits generated public outrage,2 1 0
' The lodestar method is the usual method of calculating attorneys' fees under fee-
shifting statutes. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992). It is also an
occasional method of calculating attorneys' fees in class actions involving a common fund.
See ALBA CONTE, ATrORNEY FEE AWARDS § 2.10 (2d ed. 1993).
' While there is no question that Stanley Rosenblatt put an enormous amount of work
into the Engle Florida smokers' class action and the Broin second-hand smoke flight
attendants' class action - the Engle trial alone lasted two years and included 157 witnesses,
see Bragg, supra note 69, at Al, All - it is also clear that he relied heavily on documents
unearthed in the state cases, particularly the Minnesota suit. See supra text accompanying
note 65; see also Daynard & Gottlieb, supra note 54, at 24 ("One primary reason tobacco
cases are proceeding to trial in increasing numbers is that discovery is no longer the ordeal
it once was.... While depositions of witnesses may still be expensive, particularly where
multiple defendants are involved, many of the key documents necessary to establish the
defendants' liability are now available on the Internet.").
' In the mid-1990's, the Castano group's effort to get a nationwide tobacco class
certified came to a dead end with the Fifth Circuit's decertification of the class, based in
part on the "immaturity" of the tobacco litigation and the perceived unmanageability of a
trial. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 747-49 (5th Cir. 1996). Several
years earlier, a New Jersey law firm voluntarily dismissed a strong tobacco suit after years
of trial and appeals, see Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Henry J.
Reske, Cigarette Suit Dropped: Lawyer for Estate of Rose Cipollone Says Litigation Too Expensive,
A.B.A. J., Feb. 1993, at 30, and the firm sought unsuccessfully to withdraw from its
representation of other tobacco plaintiffs, explaining that the firm was spending too much
time and money on the cases without a reasonable likelihood of recovery. See Haines v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 414 (D.N.J. 1993); Smith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 267
N.J. Super. 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); see also E.E. Mazier, Law Firms May Establish
that Unreasonable Financial Burden Justifies Withdrawal from Case, N.J. LAW., Oct. 18, 1993, at
21. As one commentator stated in connection with the plaintiffs' verdict in the Engle
Florida smokers' class action, "Just a few years ago the idea that an individual smoker
could legally triumph against a tobacco producer was unthinkable." Barry Meier, Industry
Crosses Troubling Line, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2000, at All.
2o See, e.g., Editorial, $6700 An Hour? Lawyers' Tobacco-Suit Fees Invite Revolt, USA
TODAY, May 22, 2000, at 24A; Editorial, Fee, Fi, Fo, Fum, Giant Awards for Lawyers Boggle
Mind, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 11, 1999, at 1OA; Editorial, Contingency Fee Limits, DENVER
POST, Apr. 25, 2000, at B8; Robert J. Samuelson, Justice, Not Plunder, WASH. POST, July 27,
2000, at A23; Dana S. Ciolino, How Much Should the Tobacco Lawyers Get?, THE TIMES-
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but at least the lawyers at the forefront of the state tobacco suits were
engaged in high-risk, breakthrough litigation; there were no coattails for
them to ride. In contrast, the class action lawyers in the Microsoft
antitrust litigation did not spend the time to draft their pleadings from
scratch, sensibly preferring to refer to the Justice Department litigation. 1'
While the Microsoft class action lawyers must do the work to prove
causation and damages, the work to establish that the defendant violated
212the antitrust laws was largely taken care of by the government lawyers.
Moreover, inasmuch as prior government litigation increases the
likelihood of success in piggyback private sUits, thus decreasing the
lawyers' risk of non-payment, their counsel fees should not be enhanced
by as large a risk multiplier as they might be entitled to if the failure risk
214were higher.
PICAYUNE, May 25, 2000, at B7. See also Michael Ciresi: The Anti-Marlboro Man Got the Best
Results of Anyone Fighting Big Tobacco, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 28, 1998, at A12 (quoting plaintiffs'
lawyer Michael Ciresi: "The amounts they asked for are just obscene."); Robert A. Levy,
Hired Guns Corral Contingent Fee Bonanza, LEGAL TIMEs, Feb. 1, 1999 (quoting plaintiffs'
lawyer John Coale: "[The] figures are beyond human comprehension .... The work does
not justify them."). But see Dick Scruggs, Lawyers Earned Those Fees, USA TODAY, May 22,
2000, at 24A.
211 See, e.g., Complaint, DeJulius v. Microsoft Corp., No. 1:99CV03148, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19184, at *1-2 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 1999).
212 A lawyer for one of the class actions filed in the wake of Judge Jackson's findings of
fact acknowledged, "Judge Jackson's finding gets us to third base on the liability issue. We
still have a way to go for damages." Dennis J. Opatmy & Renee Deger, A New Front in the
Microsoft War (Nov. 23, 1999), available at http://uww.lawnewsnetwork.com/stories/A10142-
1999Nov22.html (quoting attorney Daniel Mogin).
213 See supra note 10 (discussing empirical findings of higher success rates in private
antitrust and securities actions that follow government proceedings); see also Daynard &
Gottlieb, supra note 54, at 18 ("Tobacco litigation is no longer an impossibly difficult
endeavor for plaintiff attorneys.").
214 In statutory fee cases, the Supreme Court has held that the lodestar calculation may
not be altered by a risk multiplier. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 567 (1992).
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether Dague applies in common fund class
actions, but others have noted that such fee decisions present a different question from the
statutory fee decision in Dague. The Ninth Circuit explained:
Dague's rationale for barring risk multipliers in statutory fee cases does not
operate to bar risk multipliers in common fund cases.... As we read Dague, the
concerns that drove the Court to reject contingency enhancements in the
statutory fee context apply with much less force in common fund cases. Unlike
statutory fee-shifting cases, where the winners' attorneys' fees are paid by the
losing party, attorneys' fees in common fund cases are not paid by the losing
defendant, but by members of the plaintiff class, who shoulder the burden of
paying their own counsel out of the common fund.... There is nothing unfair
about contingency enhancements in common fund cases because of the equitable
notion that those who benefit from the creation of the fund should share the
wealth with the lawyers whose skill and effort helped create it.
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Under the more prevalent percentage-of-outcome method, much of
the same reasoning applies. This method involves calculating fees as a
percentage of the fund created by the judgment. Where less work is
215required of the lawyers, courts award a smaller portion of the fund .
Also, given this method's resemblance to contingent fee arrangements,
courts naturally award a higher percentage for higher risk, and a lower
211percentage for lower risk.
In sum, the lighter the work and the lower the risk, the less the lawyer
should earn, regardless of which fee calculation method a court prefers.
Coattail class actions can serve a valuable function in bringing
compensation to victims and in maintaining an appropriate level of
deterrence, but that does not mean they are as valuable as breakthrough
litigation, or that the lawyers should earn as much as they would have
had their task been more formidable.
CONCLUSION
Much can be accomplished by government lawsuits that break down
barriers against seemingly invincible defendants, and by class actions
that extend the benefits of such government lawsuits by providing
compensation to individual victims. The government suit and coattail
class action make a powerful two-pronged attack. Government litigation
provides impetus and information to further the class actions, and class
actions enhance the regulatory and deterrent effects of government suits.
The two-pronged attack becomes troubling when the prongs do not
merely reinforce each other, but rather lose their separate identities.
When government lawyers seek to settle their actions by compromising
the claims of private plaintiffs without adequate compensation, they
have wrongly allowed the government action to invade the sphere of
private litigation. By the same token, when government entities retain
private lawyers on contingent fees, they have wrongly allowed the
In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291,1299-1300 (9th Cir. 1994).
"' See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 182 B.R. 128, 139-40 (E.D. Va. 1995) (limiting amount
of contingent fees because plaintiffs' attorneys were engaging in repetitive litigation and
not much work was required for each case), affd sub nom Bergstrom v. Dalkon Shield
Claimants Trust, 86 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1996).
216 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 136, § 1803 (1986 & Supp. 2000) ("the court should
consider whether an award should be enhanced because of the contingent nature of
succeeding in the action, a factor that is independent of any additional allowance that
might be made for the quality of counsel's work."); see also Janet Cooper Alexander,
Contingent Fees and Class Actions, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 347, 348 (1998) (noting common fund
class action fee's "close parallel to individual contingent fee litigation").
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incentive structures of private litigation to invade the governmental
realm.
Despite the importance of maintaining some separation between
217government and private litigation, it is essential .that participants in
each realm consider the other. Government lawyers should be aware
that their own litigation generates outcomes and information that can be
used for private litigation as a matter of issue preclusion, legal analysis,
and, most significantly, factual investigation and discovery. Aware of
producing these public goods, they should avoid negotiating with
defendants for confidentiality without a compelling reason. In coattail
class actions, punishment, imposed by prior government litigation
should be taken into account in determining the appropriateness and
amount of punitive damages. Class counsel in coattail class actions
generally should receive lower fee awards than they would have
received in the absence of prior government litigation, to reflect the
lighter work and lower risk involved.
In trying to draw out common lessons from rather disparate
litigations, I risk oversimplification. This Article has emphasized the
distinction between government and private litigation, and in so doing
has sidestepped variations among government lawsuits. Municipalities
differ from the federal and state governments as public plaintiffs.218
Government lawsuits to recover money spent on preventing or treating
harm, such as the dominant tobacco and handgun state claims, differ
from parens patriae lawsuits to obtain compensation for harm to citizens.
They also differ from government lawsuits to enforce statutory norms,
such as the Microsoft case and most other government antitrust and
securities litigation.
Nevertheless, the coattail class action pattern presents enough
consistency to warrant examination, and the variety of government
lawsuits share enough in common to allow a meaningful contrast
between the representation of the people's interests through government
litigation and the representation of class interests through private class
actions. Given the primarily public duties and political incentives of
21F By this, I do not mean that government lawyers and private lawyers should not
work together. See Erichson, Informal Aggregation, supra note 36, manuscript at 13-14
(discussing coordinated efforts between government and private lawyers). Rather, I mean
that government lawyers and private lawyers are best situated to play different roles. See
supra text accompanying notes 115-132.
28 See Harvard Gun Note, supra note 116, at 1527 & n.38 (regarding inability of
municipalities to sue as parens patriae on behalf of citizens); see also supra text accompanying
note 108 (regarding dual character of municipal entities).
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government lawyers, and the primarily private duties and monetary
incentives of class action lawyers, it is possible to acknowledge the value
of coattail class actions as a general matter, while raising questions about
some of the recent manifestations. Viewing the phenomenon as a mixing
of public and private lawyering roles may shed light on the use of
representative litigation for resolving mass liability claims.
